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1. Introduction  
“There is no sheet music. Improvisation is required around a central 
theme…Jazz musicians live by their wits and the quality of their ear. Military 
commanders now also live by their wits and by their intuition.” 
    - Air Marshal Sir Brian Burridge (Burridge 2004) 
 
In his lecture at St. George’s House, the British field force commander for the Iraqi 
invasion, Air Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, emphasized the changing role of the military 
leader in a post-modern world. He stressed the need for adaptability as a prerequisite for 
applying national and international strategy in diverse situations. His message is even 
more applicable fifteen years later as rapid globalization and evolving crises around the 
globe have demanded interpretation and adjustment from military and civilian policy 
influencers. Currently, one of the most significant developments in global crisis 
management is the growing cooperative relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).  
 
NATO and the EU represent a unique and essential partnership which provides a 
comprehensive approach to crisis management and operations around the world. 
Together, the two security institutions represent the effective comprehensive application 
of military and civilian means to crisis management that is most pertinent to European 
security. The partnership epitomizes collaboration between two multinational 
organizations with differing strengths, weaknesses, and cultures, but which share 22 
member states between them. Both organizations are incredibly reliant on leadership 
excellence. The intriguing aspect about leadership in NATO and the EU is that, in the 
realm of the military, it is often performed by the same people.  
 
First a product of the Warsaw Summit in 2016, and reaffirmed in Brussels in 2018, 
NATO and the EU agreed to enhance cooperation in seven concrete areas, which has 
resulted in 75 projects/actions already undertaken (EEAS 2019). This cooperation draws 
more officers to the NATO-EU interface in a broader range of career paths than ever 
before. How these individual leaders manage the transition between the two 
organizations is vital to both the functionality of the NATO-EU partnership today, and 
the development of future leaders who will encounter similar challenges.
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The differences between NATO and the EU have been researched through a multitude 
of frameworks. The concept of strategic culture is the most applicable as it is used to 
describe how strategic decisions are made, and the behaviors that can be expected 
within an organization. These behavioral trends present significant leadership 
challenges to those individuals tasked with operating within two different organizations, 
often simultaneously. Academic literature tends to focus on defining a security 
institution’s strategic culture. Predominantly, the research questions concern how 
strategic culture is developed or from where a particular strategic culture is derived 
(Zyla 2011). This thesis instead looks at the role strategic culture plays in shaping the 
decisions and attitudes of those social actors within it. 
 
An elaborate or eloquent description of strategic culture serves little practical purpose to 
military leaders if it does not describe how members within that culture actually behave 
and arrive at decisions. Likewise, when social agents are tasked with shifting back and 
forth between two different strategic cultures, then they must adjust their own norms 
and patterns of behavior in accordance with the prevailing strategic culture of their 
current role. In this sense, this thesis takes a constructivist approach to strategic culture 
by better understanding the patterns of behavior of social actors. 
 
Little previous attention has been given to individuals navigating between two strategic 
cultures. Studies concerning the Europeanization, for example, of national strategic 
cultures fail to account for the behavioral requirements placed on the individual level. 
Cultures are more typically compared when they pose an adversarial relationship. 
Therefore, the possibility that some social actor would be required to adapt to one or 
another strategic culture is overlooked. NATO and the EU represent a unique interface 
of strategic cultures. It is not an intersection of two incompatible adversaries, as 
typically posed by comparative studies, but rather an interface which implies fluid 
transfer of ideas, values, and personnel between each organization. This thesis examines 
the leadership demands put on modern military officers who are asked to navigate that 
interface more regularly as NATO-EU cooperation increases. A better understanding of 
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this culture gap between the two organizations will help to understand the challenge 
confronting these leaders. 
  
Adapting to cultural difference in the military is not a new concept. To investigate 
adjustment to a new culture, the most applicable framework to this thesis is that of 
cross-cultural competence (3C). 3C research in the military stems primarily from US 
servicemembers taking on roles they were not intended for and encountering cross-
cultural challenges. The focus of the United States to better prepare officers trained in 
infantry or artillery for encountering, cooperating, and negotiating with Afghan and 
Iraqi locals has resulted in substantial concrete training directives by way of the 3C 
model. The 3C model entails the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities (KSAAs) 
which better prepare an individual for cross-cultural interaction. NATO has adopted 3C 
instruction into its training curricula for senior leaders and encourages its expansion to 
topics of multinational cooperation (Palloni 2018). 
 
This thesis, then, puts the ideas of strategic culture and 3C together. No other study has 
ever examined the strategic cultures of NATO and the EU through the very practical 
lens of 3C. The impact of such a study is implied by the question, “If we ask military 
leaders to navigate the interface between the strategic cultures of NATO and the EU, are 
we giving them the tools to succeed via 3C training?” This study, therefore, bridges the 
divide between a practical and theoretical thesis. It examines the impact of theoretical 
concepts on practical applications, which allows for a truly multi-disciplinary approach.  
 
The research design is intended to better understand the intricacies of the NATO-EU 
interface. It is modeled after the researcher’s own experiences with operability 
inspections of nuclear reactors on submarines. In such inspections, the functionality and 
reliability of the reactor could easily be ascertained through the multitude of data and 
procedures available on each platform. Daily and hourly statistics are recorded 
throughout the life of the reactor and serve to identify any trend in reactor performance. 
However, an inspection of reactor functionality goes beyond the data and takes the form 
of ethnography. Spending time to understand those people directly responsible for the 
reactor’s safe operation and gleaning wisdom from their best practices is the true goal of 
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the inspection. Similarly, this thesis steps away from traditional strategic culture 
research because it does not focus on broad, overarching strategic documents or results 
and analysis from various NATO and EU missions. This research design is focused on 
spending time with those people directly responsible for navigating the NATO-EU 
interface. Doing so serves to better understand the intricacies of the responsibility and to 
glean wisdom from their best practices.  
 
The thesis is structured to provide the reader with an elementary understanding of both 
strategic culture and 3C. It is important to understand how strategic culture is derived 
from more general culture studies because that is what makes the patterns of behavior of 
social actors so pivotal to its existence. The factors of the 3C model are investigated for 
how they are used by military leaders while they navigate the NATO-EU interface. Data 
for seven cases are obtained through semi-structured interviews with a variety of 
military officers who each encountered the NATO-EU interface from a different 
perspective. This includes senior strategic decision-makers and operational unit 
commanders leading ships on NATO and EU missions. Each case is examined for its 
own merits, and finally trends across cases are identified in order to generalize the 
findings of this study. Significant insight into case analysis is provided by the 
researcher’s own interpretive analysis of the challenges facing military leaders in the 
NATO-EU interface and determining the most applicable KSAAs for coping with those 
challenges. What follows is an initial investigation of 3C in the NATO-EU interface and 
identifies some significant trends which should prove useful to tailoring 3C training for 
future military leaders.  
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2. Literature Review 
 2.1 Strategic culture 
 
Strategic culture is a critical concept for understanding strategic issues between nations. 
However, it was not until the final third of the twentieth century that strategic culture 
truly emerged as an academic concept. Jack Snyder’s 1977 report for RAND 
Corporation, “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear 
Operations” is widely regarded as the ‘beginning’ of strategic culture studies. In this 
report, Snyder defines strategic culture as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional 
responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic 
community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other” 
(Snyder 1977, p. 9). Strategic culture appeared to solve the issue of a security actor 
operating outside of its best interests based on available information and resources, as 
rational choice theory would dictate. Instead, Snyder identified a reason for strategic 
decisions which derived from certain normative orientations. This spurred debate 
founded on the belief that culture could better explain an approach to national security 
than the traditional neorealist viewpoint had been able to. However, because much of 
this thesis is related to both culture and the behaviors it creates, it is beneficial to 
highlight key areas where, and how, strategic culture theory developed. The importance 
of this review is to describe the various levels of strategic culture which have been 
handled in previous studies. 
  
Historically, strategic culture was far from a new concept when Jack Snyder and others 
began their study in the 1970s and 1980s. Security studies have always reflected on 
characterization and understanding of one’s opponent. Strategic culture’s core tenants 
can be identified within such seminal works as Carl von Clausewitz’s On War and Sun 
Tzu’s The Art of War. Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu similarly stress the necessity for 
understanding the nature of conflict and the nature of the adversary. Looking further 
into history directs a scholar to Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian War. 
Thucydides explains the behavior of Athens and Sparta in the context of their distinct 
cultural differences. Historians and strategists have always been interested in explaining 
decision-making tendencies of states in the military realm, and Jack Snyder simply 
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coined a term in the 1970s to encapsulate that study. Strategic culture, as an academic 
concept, owes its coherence to more general studies of culture which preceded it, and 
continued to develop in parallel. Three strands of academic debate weave together to 
form the foundation of strategic culture: general culture, political culture, and particular 
ways of war. 
 
2.1.1 The cultural bases of strategic culture 
  
First, general culture studies lend to strategic culture an overall understanding of what 
factors have long-term influence on a nation’s psyche. Social scientists and 
anthropologists alike have grappled with developing a succinct and verifiable definition 
of culture. Franz Boas, the father of cultural anthropology, put forth the idea that each 
society possesses a unique culture that is influenced by historical interactions with the 
natural world and other societies (Ballinger 2006, p. 343). The sheer number and 
complexity of these influential factors have led to vague definitions often used in social 
science literature. It becomes problematic to determine which societal factors to include 
or exclude from a functional definition of culture (Hudson 1997, p. 2). Most of these 
factors can appear in one instance as firm rules which regulate a society’s culture, while 
in a separate scenario they serve as exceptions to other rules, making culture 
complicated to conceptualize in general. Yet, despite its varied conceptualization, the 
key question culture studies seek to explain is how culture influences individual 
personality and behavior (Ballinger 2006, p. 342).  
 
This thesis borrows from culture studies the aspect of internal functionality. Culture 
studies sought to generalize social groups by their behavioral tendencies and did so by 
examining how a culture manifests internally. It is most interesting to note that strategic 
culture theory emerged from a field, including the historical works of Clausewitz and 
Sun Tzu, which sought to explain “the other”. Much of the focus in strategic culture 
studies logically follows the trend of deciphering an enemy’s tactics and behavior to 
gain a predictive advantage. The study of strategic culture, therefore, has historically 
been for tactical reasons. This thesis, however, instead looks at cooperating strategic 
cultures, between partners, and attempts to analyze their compatibility.  
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The second field of culture studies which provided an academic foundation for strategic 
culture theory is the idea of political culture. Political scientists joined sociologists in 
the 1960s to link culture with observable and impactful behavior. What political 
scientists found was a way to explain the political tendencies of a society based on the 
underlying cultural traits which it held. Almond and Verba were among the first to 
define political culture as “a subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to the 
political system” (Lantis 2005). In this sense, they suggested that collective 
understanding of these beliefs and values could be used to explain distinct behaviors 
and decisions in various political fields. One field of Almond and Verba’s political 
culture is the use of military force, the focused study of which naturally gave rise to the 
strategic culture discipline (Almond & Verba 1965, pp. 11-14).  
 
Comparatists embraced political culture as an interesting link or independent variable 
influencing the outcome, or the choice made. Adda Bozeman saw war and related 
phenomena as “aspects of locally prevalent values, images, traditions, and mental 
constructs” (Bozeman 1976). Culture served, in political studies, as a means to represent 
the norms, values, and modes of thinking that survive change and remain meaningful to 
successive generations. Early political culture theorists attempted to define a nation’s 
political character in terms of enduring factors: the nation’s language, religion, 
socialization, and its interpretation of common memories (Elkins and Simeon 1979). 
Each of these factors were found to influence the role perception and decision-making 
of a particular political institution.  
 
Political culture theory was criticized in the 1980s for being epiphenomenal and 
subjective. In striving to incorporate increasingly complex definitions of culture, it 
seemed that political culture could explain every behavior within an isolated system. 
This in turn led to the abandonment of cultural interpretive arguments in what Lantis 
identifies as “the behavioral revolution in the social sciences” (Lantis 2005). Gray, 
retrospectively in 1984, points out the logic of strategic culture stemming from the 
political culture discipline (Gray 1984). He claimed a social culture likely encourages a 
certain style of behavior in the realm of national security. This focused study of how a 
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nation addresses the concept of armed conflict is characterized as a particular way of 
war. 
 
Continuing the tradition of Thucydides, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu in characterizing 
warfare, Liddell Hart published The British Way in Warfare in 1932. He addressed what 
he saw as a distinctly British approach to warfare which involved economic pressure 
through naval operations and financing auxiliaries to bear the cost of ground fighting 
(Hart 1932). As a telling example, Hart used the protracted campaign of World War I to 
show the consequences of not acting in accordance with one’s own national way of war. 
By focusing on trench warfare in a ground campaign, the British abandoned what Hart 
alluded to as its natural style. Later in the 20th century, ideas of American, Chinese, and 
Soviet ways of war also emerged. Weigley, for example, identified the strategies of 
attrition and annihilation as critical aspects of America’s strategic tendencies (Uz 
Zaman 2009, p. 71). Recently, the idea of a particular way of war has expanded beyond 
national boundaries to include a “European way of war” (Vennesson et al 2008). These 
studies rely on trends and patterns in strategic logic to characterize a nation or security 
institution.  
 
Through these various concepts, strategic culture serves as a means to characterize “the 
way of doing business” within a security institution. It relies on the social influence of 
culture, the institutionalized lens of decision-making similar to organizational or 
political culture, and results in a particular style unique to that security institution. 
However, the gap between a particular way of war and the study of strategic culture lies 
between the how and why of strategic tendencies. Studies of national ways of war are 
descriptive in nature by seeking how a nation utilizes its armed forces. This approach 
defines a lagging variable across historical events with the intention that such a 
description may provide utility to understanding future interactions. Such analysis does 
not provide sufficient predictive capacity for a study of internal aspects of a particular 
culture. Strategic culture, on the other hand, seeks to explain why a nation utilizes its 
armed forces in the manner it does through analysis rather than description. 
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The first indication of a move from descriptive particular ways of war to the more 
analytical strategic culture is Colin S. Gary’s 1971 “What Rand Hath Wrought” (Lantis 
2005). In assessing American and Soviet nuclear strategies, Gray opposed the rational-
actor theories that were typically used to explain nuclear deterrence and arms control. 
Instead, he proposed that the very ideas of deterrence and escalation may be interpreted 
differently based on the collective understanding held by the decision-makers in each 
society. Gray claimed that pure rationality fell short when such a variance in the 
conceptualization of a particular scenario existed between societies. The study of why 
these ideas are interpreted within a society was imperative to future study. Jack Snyder 
(1977) defined strategic culture for the first time as that link. Development of the 
strategic culture concept has taken various paths over the past four decades. The most 
widely accepted categorization of the academic debate is to group certain time periods 
into three generations, as Alastair Iain Johnston (1995) has done. 
 
 2.1.2 Three generations of strategic culture  
 
The first generation of strategic culture studies, born directly from studies of national 
character and national ways of war, focused on the difference between US and Soviet 
nuclear war doctrines. Snyder (1977) coined the term “strategic culture”, which he 
found was a semi-permanent characteristic thatprovided an explanation for strategic 
divergence between the US and USSR on nuclear doctrine. Elites, he argued, served to 
articulate public opinion into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking that was 
moderated by socialization (Lantis 2005). Ken Booth (1979) followed with an in-depth 
look at how cultural relativism explains how an actor is influenced by his or her own 
cultural conditioning. This conditioning provides the ideational foundations of strategies 
and relations between the two superpowers, and more coherently accounts for their 
differences in approach (Lantis 2005). Similarly, this thesis relies on cultural 
conditioning to better understand how strategic culture influences a social actor’s 
decisions. 
 
In analyzing the Soviet approach to nuclear doctrine, David Jones (1990) concluded that 
strategic culture pervasively influenced every level of decision-making from Soviet 
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grand strategy down to tactics. He further categorized strategic culture into macro-
environmental factors (geography, ethnocultural characteristics, history), societal 
factors (social, economic, and political structures), and micro-level factors (military 
institutions and civil-military relations) (Johnston 1995, p. 37). Each first-generation 
scholar found that strategic culture could be presented as the primary explanation for 
differences in nuclear strategy between the US and USSR. 
 
Criticism of the first generation’s strategic culture focuses on its definitional, 
deterministic, and instrumental deficiencies. First, and foremost, is the broad nature of 
the first-generation definition of strategic culture. From Snyder’s (1977) definition to 
Jones’ (1990) categories, nearly every societal factor is taken into account. This creates 
an amorphous concept consisting of influential factors which could likely stand as their 
own, and often competing, independent variables. Future generations of strategic culture 
theorists claimed that the nature of this definition was tautological, meaning that this 
version of strategic culture was incredibly difficult to test (Johnston 1995, p. 37). These 
opponents argued that if everything is included in the definition, then what can strategic 
culture be tested against to prove its validity? 
 
Similarly, Johnston (1995) and Lantis (2005) point out that the sheer number and 
diversity of factors included in the definition would not remain consistent over time, 
and likely produce alternative strategic cultures when some variables are included or 
eliminated. The ambiguous hierarchy of variables within the definition allows a scholar 
to characterize a strategic culture in an ambiguous way. This thesis utilizes a 
conceptualization of strategic culture from the third generation, which better clarifies its 
constituent components.  
 
The second generation, which emerged in the mid-1980’s, focused on the 
instrumentality of strategic culture and differentiated between declaratory and 
operational strategies. This particular strand of study has little applicability to this thesis 
because of the constructivist approach taken in line with the first and third generations. 
The second generation has been largely rejected for its lack of consistency with 
contemporary leadership studies (Johnston 1995, Klein 1988).  
  14 
 
Emerging in the 1990s, the third generation of strategic culture more closely resembles 
the first generation’s framework. The third generation shares the belief with the first 
that ideational or cultural variables influence behavior and decision-making. However, 
the third generation offers more rigorous treatment of the independent variables. 
Johnston (1995) explains the difference as the third generation’s exclusion of behavior 
within its definition of culture. These studies avoid the tautological trap which the first 
generation suffered from in defining strategic culture by using behavior as a dependent 
variable.  
 
In line with the focus of this thesis, Theo Farrell (2002) views the third generation as the 
merger of culturalism and constructivism. It is a way to study the impact of norms and 
ideas on international security. Farrell found that culture shapes preference formation 
within military organizations by reinforcing identity norms, which in turn shapes 
members’ behavioral output. The constructivist approach of the third generation 
explains identity formation influenced by organizational processes, history, tradition, 
and culture (Lantis 2005).  
 
Johnston (1995) also warns that the third generation must remain disciplined in using 
behavior as the dependent variable, and not doctrine or policy. This is a critical step to 
avoid the criticism of the second generation, which claimed that strategic culture only 
influences declaratory strategy and not operational decision-making. The constructivist 
approach dictates that third-generation scholars must rely on the verifiable output of 
behaviors, and not simply words written or spoken by elites. An additional consequence 
of this focus is that third generation studies tend to focus on only the output of a given 
strategic culture. This allows for comparative studies of the inputs and outputs but does 
little to examine the internal functionality of a strategic culture, as illustrated in Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1. Analytic display of research objects (identified by red arrows) of third generation 
strategic culture studies. (Researcher’s own) 
 
An overwhelming majority of strategic culture literature examines the external inputs, 
outputs, or consequences of strategic culture on a security community. Very few look at 
the internal workings, or the individuals specifically acting within the strategic culture. 
With his advancement of cultural adaptation theory, Farrell (2005) represents the closest 
perspective of strategic culture to the one taken by this thesis. Farrell explains how 
security actors – individuals – modify their military practices in order to avoid violating 
societal norms. He is regarded as somewhat unique in this approach because he 
examines the internal aspects of strategic culture and how actors adjust to them. He 
advocates for closer relations between the constructivist and rationalist approaches to 
security studies. Likewise, this thesis separates from a strong majority of strategic 
culture literature by looking at the internal functionality of a strategic culture.  
 
 2.1.3 Separating strategic, organizational, and political cultures 
 
The internal functionality of a culture, especially institutional cultures found in NATO 
and the EU, is often addressed by organizational culture. Political culture, as discussed, 
may also provide insight into how decisions are shaped based on prevailing cultural 
pressures. Strategic culture, however, is unique in that it concerns the output of 
Strategic Culture A Strategic Culture B
Inputs Inputs
Outputs Outputs
Strategic documents
Strategic decisions
Role perception
Strategic documents
Strategic decisions
Role perception
National interests
Institutional structures
Historical factors
National interests
Institutional structures
Historical factors
Comparative
Studies
Descriptive
Studies
Internal functionality Internal functionality
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organizational decision-making. Organizational culture, or the collective understanding 
of symbols and limitations, describes the formation of such a strategic output. Johnston 
(1995) noted that strategic culture definitions do not vary much from those of political 
or organizational culture. Where organizational culture ends and strategic culture begins 
is a question of how strategic culture is accumulated and passed on. 
 
This thesis analyzes the gate-keepers or bearers of strategic culture and such an 
‘internal’ examination tends to blur the line between organizational and strategic 
cultures. Yitzhak Klein characterized the bearers of strategic culture as those “who are 
charged with defining the military objective of war and devising the means of achieving 
it…The effect of strategic culture is likely to be felt most prominently at the level of 
operational thinking” (Klein 1991). He goes on to characterize the military’s impact on 
political culture, as well. Legro (1995) and Klein (1997) take a similar approach with 
organizational culture. Based on their analysis, organizational culture across militaries 
tend to be quite similar – hierarchical, rigid, and distinct. Strategic culture, however, 
represents the direction and purpose which serve as the guiding objective of the 
development of an organizational culture.  
 
2.2 Strategic culture of the EU  
 
This thesis approaches the EU’s strategic culture viewed through the constructivist 
approach of third-generation of strategic culture studies. The strategic culture of the EU 
presents an interesting and unique debate within strategic culture scholarship. First and 
foremost, is disagreement over whether or not the EU has a unique strategic culture. 
Previous scholarship took for granted that international actors such as the US, USSR, 
UK, Germany, and Japan possessed the requisite factors to develop a strategic culture, 
and due to this assumption, failed to derive appropriate metrics for determining whether 
an actor’s strategic culture exists in the first place. Biava et al (2011) highlighted the 
sheer lack of operationalization applied to strategic culture through the literature. They 
note that there are no agreed upon metrics for judging when a strategic culture has been 
obtained, or a typology to guide literature into classifying a possible strategic culture. 
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What is interesting to note is the lack of literature focused on the existence of a NATO 
strategic culture. NATO’s strategic culture is largely taken for granted as an inherent 
quality of the long-standing military alliance. Zyla (2011), for example, acknowledges 
the dominant strategic culture of NATO from the time of the Cold War. He uses 
NATO’s interpretation of challenges and threats, behavioral norms, and role of third 
parties to contrast the EU’s approach to the same issues in order to define the EU 
strategic culture as it relates to NATO’s. Becker (2012), perhaps comes closest to an 
analytical assessment of NATO’s strategic culture by performing an analytical 
comparison of NATO Strategic Concepts and U.S. National Security Documents. His 
conclusion that there is not significant convergence between the two, and despite the 
overwhelming burden shared by the United States, he still points to an independent 
NATO strategic culture. It is in line with this finding that this thesis assumes NATO’s 
and the EU’s strategic cultures are, in fact, different. 
 
A broad look at the literature on the EU’s strategic culture will quickly inform the 
reader that there is more debate than there is agreement about a potential strategic 
culture in the EU. As much has been written on the non-existence of an EU strategic 
culture as has been written trying to define its characteristics. It seems, as well, that 
each international crisis in which the EU could play a role also changes the trajectory of 
some scholars’ opinions on the matter (for example, Libya 2011). Thus, two major 
groupings of literature exist. The first consists of those which support the idea that the 
EU, as an international actor, has or is developing an autonomous strategic culture. This 
includes research that contends that convergence of national strategic cultures through 
EU institutions constitutes a unique EU strategic culture. The second consists of those 
who do not believe the EU can be or become, due to various limitations, an autonomous 
security or defense actor, and therefore has no distinct strategic culture. 
 
Cornish and Edwards (2001) composed the first in-depth assessment of what they 
concluded was a developing EU strategic culture. In doing so, they defined strategic 
culture as “the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military 
force…with general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with 
military capabilities” (Cornish & Edwards 2001, p. 587). The historical context of this 
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definition is worth noting, as 2001 saw the EU institutionalizing its security and defense 
structures more rapidly than ever before. This was, however, before the structuring 
following the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 which saw the creation of institutional entities like 
the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
 
Within the same timeframe, Howorth (2002) similarly identified the potential 
convergence of institutions, policies, and capabilities based on ideational and cognitive 
homogeneity within European states. Howorth categorized six divergences within EU 
actors: allied/neutral, Atlanticist/Europeanist, professional power projection/conscript-
based territorial defense, nuclear/non-nuclear powers, large/small states, and weapons 
systems providers/consumers. Krotz (2009) noted how EU enlargement in 2004 only 
exacerbated these differences but left open the fact that institutional convergence can 
still occur over time. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Howorth 
(2002) acknowledged, was a tool which had helped to narrow the gaps in these 
divergences. The European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU Global Strategy which 
replaced the ESS in 2016, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have 
served as institutional tools of convergence to minimize these differences as Member 
States tend towards Europeanization, making a distinct EU strategic culture more 
probable. 
 
Myer (2005) presented a constructivist support for an EU strategic culture based on the 
convergence of norms in a similar context to Howorth’s divergences. Myer argued that 
based on the voting structure within CSDP, an EU strategic culture must draw on the 
collective Member States’ norms regarding the use of force. He hypothesized three 
results: a self-defense only strategic culture, collectively upgraded norms towards 
expansion of CSDP to a more activist strategic culture, or a hybrid of the two which 
would then become institutionalized and internalized. His prediction of a progressive 
de-prioritization of strictly territorial defense and lingering differences, amongst 
Member States, on the use of force abroad to pre-empt a security threat is consistent 
with later works on the same topics (Zyla 2011, Johansen 2017). By 2017, it is clear that 
the utilization of EU military assets remains a contentious subject, but that a de-
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prioritization of strictly territorial defense has certainly occurred. This is reflected in the 
broad experiences represented within the cases of this thesis. 
 
Where Norheim-Martinsen (2011) varied from previous works, although similarly 
constructivist as the rest of the third generation, is that he argued that the EU found its 
strategic culture through preferred means of action. Comprehensive security action, he 
found, was a culturally conditioned end sought by the EU. This means that the goal of a 
strategic decision is not necessarily the use of force, but rather the creation of a 
comprehensive approach. Norheim-Martinsen pointed to the ESS as an expression of 
the EU’s strategic narrative to drive towards cohesion. The ESS, however, has been 
both a blessing and a curse to those seeking to define the EU’s strategic culture.  
 
As Zyla (2011) noted, the ESS is an activist interpretation of security with normative 
goals. The EU is typically averse to using military force to achieve political objectives 
because such action would run counter to the civilian normative power the EU seeks to 
be. That results in strategic ambiguity which some scholars capitalize on to point to a 
lack of EU strategic culture. According to Rynning (2003), disagreements within the 
EU over threat analysis and the use of military force typically results in a failure to take 
action, as in Libya in 2011. Such a lack of sufficiently coherent or consistent approach 
to the use of force, for Rynning, and for Tardy (2007), does not allow for a productive 
discussion of an EU strategic culture. The rest of this school points to convergence of 
interests as a pre-requisite to the development of an EU strategic culture. 
 
A second argument used against an EU strategic culture is multi-level governance. 
Haine (2011) noted that the EU cannot be regarded as having a single coherent strategic 
culture as an autonomous actor because of the variety of influences from the multi-level 
system. She argues that CSDP is a political tool focused on the EU’s global image and 
legitimacy, and that political and security beliefs should not be confused with strategic 
culture. Similarly, Freedman (2004) took a contrarian approach to what Norheim-
Martinsen (2011) later saw as a way to identify an EU strategic culture. Freedman 
argued that military doctrine from CSDP would be dysfunctional because it comes from 
a sense of political unity and would therefore not be effective guidance in an active 
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conflict. Additionally, Bailes (1999) noted that a lack of “distinct European models or 
set of European values in organization of defence” meant the failure to develop an EU 
strategic culture. It has been difficult to argue in recent literature, that her argument is 
invalid, despite the massive reorganization of security and defense structures following 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
 
Such academic debate paints a complex picture concerning the EU’s strategic culture 
and only highlights the intricate nature of a civilian enterprise operating in the realm of 
international security and defense. Complexities abound concerning the EU’s relation to 
the use of military force. As such, navigating the EU’s security environment would be 
equally complex for an individual coping with the various influences on EU strategic 
culture, however it is defined. Thus, this thesis focuses not on resolving the debate over 
the existence or nature of the EU’s strategic culture, but aligns with the constructivists 
of the third generation, like Farrell (2005), and examines the impact of such 
complexities on the internal functionality of a strategic culture. Emphasis is placed on 
expanding this thread of research (internal functionality) because of the increased 
importance of individual military leaders in the post-modern military.  
 
As the general trend in military activity continues towards interventionism, greater 
responsibility is placed throughout the military chain of command for developing 
critical thinking and agile leaders. Interventionism has forced the military towards 
adapting and coordinating with civil affairs leading to the emergence of the “soldier-
diplomat” (Burke 2010). Similar terms like “strategic corporal” point to the competence 
required by all military personnel to understand their strategic position in world affairs 
and cooperate effectively in a civilian-oriented environment (Krulak 1999). Nowhere is 
this truer than in NATO-EU cooperation. Military leaders throughout the various levels 
of strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making must adapt effectively to this 
increased responsibility. The success of the partnership depends on it. 
 
Therefore, this thesis steps away from traditional strategic culture literature in order to 
examine the internal functionality of such a culture. Strategic culture literature tends to 
touch on the importance of internal aspects, such as the “socialization of elites”, but 
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does not develop this concept to much extent. This thesis adds an important 
development to strategic culture literature by not only characterizing the internal 
challenges associated with a particular strategic culture but also how military leaders 
adapt to a cultural shift. It is most useful to approach such a study from a framework 
already developed by the military for cultural adaptation: cross-cultural competence. 
 
 2.3 Cross-cultural competence (3C) 
 
The field of intercultural competence, and the necessarily skills associated with these 
interactions, is broad and diverse. The development of intercultural competence studies 
traces its roots to the emergence of organizational culture theories of the 1950s and 
1960s.  There is a massive amount of literature on cultural competency across diverse 
fields of psychology, anthropology, communication, and linguistics, and each of their 
subfields, that it requires the researcher to accurately identify where a study falls within 
the greater scholarship on such a topic. The focus of this thesis concerns the 
development of cultural competence in a military context. Specifically, how an 
individual should operate in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous 
environment of the EU’s security institutions. By 2007, the US Department of Defense 
(DoD) realized that it must expand its efforts to train personnel to be effective in 
culturally different scenarios (Abbe et al. 2007). Issues in Afghanistan and Iraq at the 
time prompted a surge in resources and focus on culture in the military. Much of these 
resources were manifest in research grants for developing training models for use with 
military personnel. The gap in military-specific literature in this field was large, as 
previous studies focused on expatriates, Peace Corps volunteers, and study abroad 
students. Similarities between requirements of these jobs and military deployment in a 
combat zone were minimal (Gallus et al. 2014, p. v).  
 
Prior to 2007, much of the US military’s effort on cultural competence focused on 
learning a particular language within a particular region. As Abbe et al (2007) 
highlighted in a report for the US Army Research Institute (ARI), full-spectrum military 
operations demanded a broad cultural capability that was more than expertise of a 
specific region. Cross-cultural competence (3C) served as the general skill set that was 
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most appealing to the US military in a military context. It offered an ability to identify 
measurable variables and characteristics which could therefore be trained to improve the 
cultural adaptability of military forces (Gabrenya et al 2012). Abbe et al (2007) 
established the first definition of 3C used within US Army research: “an individual 
capability that contributes to intercultural effectiveness regardless of the particular 
intersection of cultures”. In doing so, they linked the US military’s approach to 3C with 
particular knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs) germane to effective 
cross-cultural performance (Gallus et al. 2014). 
 
Abbe et al (2007), and therefore the greater US DoD, thus confined military 3C within 
the cognitive, affective, and behavioral (CAB) paradigm, one of the two major 
paradigms of intercultural competence scholarship. Hammer (2015) summarized the 
two paradigms as a difference in epistemology and therefore level of precision of the 
results. The construct used by Abbe and others, the CAB paradigm, examines personal 
factors through the lens of cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions in order to 
determine an individual’s intercultural competence. This paradigm is the most 
widespread and dominant trend in 3C research and has resulted in a continuously 
growing list of skills and components. Most simply, studies within this paradigm 
produce results such as, for example, ‘if one is to have strong 3C, then he or she must 
have a high tolerance of ambiguity’. These are very clear and ordinal independent or 
antecedent variables which directly relate to an overall quality of 3C.  
 
Of course, a list of characteristics which can be tested for, and trained to, is in harmony 
with the cognitive/instructional education paradigm of classic military training. If a 
study, for example, identifies high tolerance for ambiguity as a 3C factor, then the Army 
can attempt to train officers to improve their tolerance for ambiguity. However, as 
Hammer (2015) acknowledged, the CAB paradigm has its shortcomings.  Spitzberg and 
Changnon (2009) identified within the literature a collection of 264 components of 
intercultural competence, 64 cognitive/personality traits, 77 affective/attitudinal 
dimensions, and 124 behavioral/skill factors cited. The inconsistency and overlap 
among many of the factors clearly demonstrate how much a given study’s cultural 
context varies the results within the CAB paradigm. There is little agreement from CAB 
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study to CAB study of what specific independent variables influence 3C. 3C within 
Peace Corps volunteers, it seems, requires different factors than 3C in Army soldiers 
negotiating in Afghanistan or expatriates in corporate industry (Spitzberg and Changnon 
2009).  
 
The pioneering Abbe et al. (2007) report was part of a larger DoD study titled “Cultural 
Understanding and Language Proficiency” which analyzed and combined existing 
measures of cross-cultural performance from a variety of different disciplines. In this 
regard, the report became the launching point for future DoD 3C literature. The report 
determined that certain general competencies outweighed specific regional or language 
skills in determining intercultural effectiveness, and even identified possible antecedent 
variables to the construct including dispositional, biographical, and identity constructs 
(Gallus 2014, p. 3). From this basis, two schools of 3C research have emerged. The first 
is the assessment school, represented by Ross et al (2010), Gabrenya et al (2012), and 
others which seek to further refine the conceptualization and operationalization of 3C 
and its assessment methods. The second is the education and training school, 
represented by Reid et al (2012), McCloskey et al (2010), and others which seek to 
illustrate optimal training modes to assist in the development of 3C KSAAs. 
 
In the assessment school, Ross et al (2010) developed a 3C inventory in order to 
operationalize the definition of 3C in future studies and assessments. A simplified 
version of these types of 3C studies is illustrated in Figure 2. They took a rational-
empirical approach to the factors which influence 3C by conducting both literature 
review and in-depth interviews with subject matter experts. The goal of the project was 
to “provide a military-relevant instrument that could be used to predict the readiness of 
our force for cross-cultural missions” (Ross et al. 2010, p. 1). This approach, combining 
deductive and inductive reasoning to define a model for 3C, is most similar to the 
research design undertaken within this thesis. Ross et al. (2010) began with an extensive 
literature review in order to consolidate towards a singular conceptualization of 3C. 
Additionally, the literature review allowed the researchers to catalogue previous 
operationalizations used in other, non-military, instruments. Armed with a broad array 
of possible variables for operationalization, the team then conducted interviews with 
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nine Army soldiers who recently returned from deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The result was an inventory of operationalized 3C constructs with increased validity 
because of their practical derivation. This study allowed the DoD to further focus 
further on the specific operationalizations which it believed could be trained, and 
therefore improved.  
 
 
Figure 2. Analytic display of a basic 3C study. Defining the component factors of 3C is the 
research aim. (Researcher’s own) 
 
Significant advances have been made over the past decade in improving the 
classification of certain factors concerning 3C. One of the main difficulties in compiling 
a 3C inventory is the ambiguity involved in distinguishing a potential variable as either 
antecedent or part of the 3C construct itself. Task-analysis-based methods have proven 
to be reliable in minimizing this ambiguity. A task analysis focuses on specific 
behavioral examples through interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) to better 
understand the characteristics essential to job performance (Trejo et al 2015). This 
approach enables researchers to better separate the personal characteristics, antecedents, 
from the performance-based aspects of 3C therefore improving the validity of such an 
operationalization. This creates a more credible and valid list of KSAAs which 
comprise 3C independent of personality traits. 
 
The education and training school emerged in tandem with the assessment school and 
focused more on the developmental sequence of 3C. Reid et al. (2012) sought to codify 
a developmental process in order to provide DoD personnel the ability to “successfully 
work” in cross-cultural situations. This meant the literature required more attention 
concerning how to teach and improve 3C, rather than to simply identify its component 
“Home” Culture “Foreign” Culture
Cross-cultural 
competence
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factors and KSAAs as Ross et al. (2010) had done. Reid and colleagues propose specific 
training methods for the KSAAs identified by the 3C inventory. However, more 
research is still needed to determine which of these KSAAs are more malleable so that 
instructors can maximize their efforts. Methods to better equip future leaders with the 
necessary 3C KSAAs have been assessed by Abbe & Gallus (2011) and Solomon et al 
(2009), who focused on computer simulations to model cross-cultural interactions and 
scenarios. This type of training assessment represents the most practical follow-on study 
to this thesis, which falls within the assessment school.  
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3. Research Question 
 
In simplest form, this thesis seeks to understand what it is like for a military leader to 
operate within both NATO and the EU. The research question guiding this study is, 
“What skills are necessary to adapt between differing strategic cultures?” The 
thesis therefore attempts to identify the leadership challenge created by an EU strategic 
culture through the lens of intercultural interactions. Rather than attempting to define 
EU strategic culture in relation to other security actors, which is bountiful in other 
literature, this thesis attempts to understand how the EU’s strategic culture is exhibited 
on a practical and personal level. With this purpose, the research intends to identify the 
most significant KSAAs which enable adaptation to a culturally different organization 
while using 3C as a foundation.  
 
The goal is to operationalize 3C for individuals operating between distinct strategic 
cultures. Practically, this means testing the cross-cultural competence framework for 
both consistent and unique operationalizations within the realm of NATO-EU relations. 
Although the data represent practical lessons learned for bridging the cultural divide 
between NATO and EU assignments for military officers, the results are more far-
reaching. 
 
First, and foremost, the practical results will inform leadership development for future 
officers responsible for navigating the NATO-EU interface. 
 
Second, the thesis will add evidence to the discussion concerning the EU’s strategic 
culture. By testing 3C in NATO-EU operations, what is also being tested is the gap 
between NATO and EU strategic cultures. The prospective null hypothesis of this study 
would be that if the challenges described at the NATO-EU interface are not alleviated 
or explained by the facors of 3C, then it is unlikely that such a scenario can be classified 
as a cross-cultural interaction. This would provide evidence towards a lack of major 
differences between NATO and the EU’s strategic cultures.  
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Finally, this thesis serves to fill a gap in 3C literature which has thus far failed to 
address necessary KSAAs for operating in a cooperative, multinational environment. 
Mainstream strategic culture research has predominantly focused on the governmental-
level, but this study deepens that view by looking at internal functionality within the 
bearers of strategic culture on the sub-governmental level – where strategic culture 
actually happens. 
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4. Theoretical Framework 
 
As the Literature Review section highlighted, there are a number of ongoing debates 
concerning the major frameworks involved in this thesis. This thesis does not attempt to 
weigh in on certain technical debates about the validity of one school of thought over 
another. Instead, various aspects of the two major constituents, strategic culture and 
cross-cultural competence, are explored as they relate to one another. Certain theoretical 
assumptions are made to guide this study into a coherent analysis, not necessarily 
because they provide the deepest academic rigor in line with the theoretical debate of 
the day, but because they allow for more practical application of otherwise academic 
ideas. The focus of this thesis is on how individual leaders are affected by a defense 
partnership, and an analytic display of the entire research concept is provided in Figure 
4 (p. 40). This section provides the lens with which the situation is viewed, by means of 
definitions, assumptions, and potential pitfalls. 
 
 4.1 Socially constructed strategic culture 
 
 4.1.1 Conceptualizing strategic culture 
 
The body of literature available concerning the EU-NATO relationship is vast and has 
been analyzed from any number of perspectives. However, most of this literature is 
predominantly descriptive rather than analytical. Much of what is discussed about the 
EU-NATO interface is the compatibility of the two organizations and the results each 
achieves in various scenarios. This is beneficial for exploring how cooperation can be 
better achieved in future operations but does little to understand how to navigate the 
EU-NATO interface presently. Specifically, when the question of the EU’s strategic 
culture is raised, it is often approached by means of classifying or defining its approach 
to strategic issues. The most important question asked, according to Zyla (2011), is 
usually how is the EU different from other security actors? This thesis instead asks how 
those differences are manifested in day-to-day interactions in order to achieve practical 
guidance from an otherwise academic endeavor. 
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By doing so, this thesis avoids the redundancy of trying to trace the complex and 
interwoven relationship between various strategic documents which regulate EU-NATO 
cooperation. It also avoids all together the question of defining the EU’s strategic 
culture. In this sense, this research builds from Zyla (2011) by offering analysis of the 
impact or effect of the EU’s strategic culture. It logically follows, then, that if the EU 
has no distinct strategic culture, then there should be no effect on cultural norms 
between the strategic assets of both the EU and NATO. Therefore, this research adds 
depth to strategic culture study by examining the level where culture actually happens, 
among the relationships and daily activities of the individuals who make up the security 
and defense institution.  
 
The constructivist perspective is needed to focus on the personal experience of strategic 
culture by those social actors affected by it. The constructivist paradigm provides 
greater depth to the intersubjective understanding of the challenges associated with 
adaptation to the EU. NATO and the EU are comprised of almost exactly the same 
groups and actors in military terms. However, because there are assumed cultural 
differences between the two, this points to certain behaviorisms and irrationalities 
which require synthesis via constructivist means. A rational approach may provide 
insight into the power dynamic of the interface or the ‘give and take’ of cultural values 
and behavioral norms from a competitive perspective. However, the social interaction 
involved is a process during which fundamental agent properties change through social 
learning. Constructivism and rationalism indeed complement one another in a wide 
view of adaptation, but this thesis focuses on the social interaction through the 
constructivist paradigm (Fearon & Wendt 2002). It is possible that such social norms 
create the challenges, which are then solved by rational behaviors in order to achieve 
success. In this case, both paradigms provide their own form of understanding. This is 
very much aligned with one of the preeminent strategic culturists’, Colin S. Gray’s, 
view on the subject. Gray contemplated retrospectively on the subject, “Should I lose 
sleep worrying about whether I am a neoclassical realist or a constructivist? Could I 
possibly be both? Well, I think I am indeed both” (Gray 2007, p. 3). 
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Strategic culture is understood here to be an independent or intervening variable within 
the constructivist paradigm. It serves to affect the behavior of social agents by 
influencing their perception of the world. Social actors, then, reproduce the norms and 
structures of society “by reflexively basing their actions on their acquired knowledge, 
habits, and routines” (Zyla 2011, p. 670). Thus, strategic culture explains the why 
behind the actions, and has allowed for closer analysis of the context in which social 
actors operate.  
 
However, the current body of research tends to apply more constitutive theory to 
strategic culture than it does appeal for causality (see Norheim-Martinsen 2011, Zyla 
2011, Johansen 2017, and others). Constitutive theory requires the researcher to ask 
questions such as “what” and “how possible” is strategic culture in a given scenario. 
This thesis uses constitutive theorizing as strictly non-causal. To borrow from Norheim-
Martinsen (2011), “from this understanding, we can move on to pinpoint the social 
mechanisms through which strategic culture reveals itself” (Norheim-Martinsen 2011, 
p. 520). In line with Klein’s (1991) concept of bearers of strategic culture, military 
officers are presented as the platform through which strategic culture manifests.  
 
The conceptualization of strategic culture for this thesis is built on such a constructivist, 
constitutive foundation. With only a very slight variation from the definition used by 
Myer (2005), this thesis defines strategic culture as comprising the socially transmitted, 
identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among a broad 
majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to 
shape the pursuit of security and defense goals.  
 
Several features of this conceptualization stand out to support the goals of the thesis. 
First, the individual aspects of identity-derived norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior 
combine to represent an overarching understanding of the group’s relation to the outside 
world. There is a certain ‘way of doing business’ that is unique to a particular 
community and is a result of the community’s identity narrative. Second, strategic 
culture is a majoritarian concept which represents a wholistic tendency towards certain 
norms and behaviors. Just as national identities are debated within the group, strategic 
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culture can also be represented heterogeneously and debated among its members. 
However, this study takes a wholistic approach looking for generally majoritarian 
norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior. Finally, this definition draws on the sociological 
roots of strategic culture in general culture theories. Such a conceptualization adds 
depth to strategic culture studies by examining the individual, internal level.  
 
It must be noted that this conceptualization immediately stirs certain questions about its 
assumptions and functionality. Three potential criticisms are worth addressing at this 
point. First, the proposed conceptualization, much like the constructivist literature of the 
first generation of strategic culture, is at risk of appearing tautological. That is, a theory 
that is true by nature of the form of the argument. The conceptualization includes 
behavior within the definition of strategic culture, which typically is an immediate 
indication of tautology in strategic culture literature. As a study in the realm of 
constitutive theory, this research avoids the question of causality between behavior and 
culture. The focus here is on what leadership knowledge and skills are required to 
navigate this interface and does not intend to make an explicit causal assertion on behalf 
of the existence or non-existence of an EU strategic culture in general.  
 
Second, it may be argued that the requisite initial conditions have not been established 
for a strategic culture in the EU to warrant study. Snyder stressed that strategic culture 
should only be brought in to explain a phenomena once “a distinctive approach to 
strategy becomes ingrained in training, institutions, and force posture…[when] strategic 
culture had taken on a life of its own, distinct from the social interests that helped give 
rise to it” (Snyder 1990, p. 7). This is certainly an acceptable criticism to the validity of 
the given conceptualization. The EU continues to undergo certain institutional changes 
and developments in its foreign and security policy. This, in turn, questions whether the 
EU will ever fit Snyder’s criteria for an established strategic culture. Can a strategic 
culture truly become ingrained in an international institution if roles, constituent 
Member States, and the institutional environment consistently change? It is worth 
looking into these questions concerning the nature of NATO’s strategic culture as well. 
However, this thesis is constructed in such a way to serve as a barometer to sample the 
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development of an EU strategic culture. It may offer insight into some of these 
questions by continuing to ask the “what possible” questions. 
 
Finally, this conceptualization assumes, as Zyla (2011) did, that the EU and NATO are 
sovereign and autonomous social actors that act independently of their member states. 
By taking a majoritarian approach towards the culture that exists in the EU’s security 
community, it assumes that there exists a supranational coalescence of norms, ideas, and 
patterns of behavior, and that this coalescence is unique to the international organization 
rather than simply a projection of national tendencies. Schmidt (2011) has argued that 
certain dominant member states, such as France and the United States in pursuit of their 
own interests in the EU and NATO, tend to dictate cultural notions within the 
organizations as well. Additionally, Cornish and Edwards (2001) highlighted how 
military structures continue to be governed under the Council of the EU and not the 
Commission. This maintains military operations out of strictly European control and 
opens the present conceptualization to such criticism. However, the decision-making 
mechanism of consensus in the Council ensures that the strategic actions undertaken 
serve as a compromise between national strategic cultures. There is no qualified 
majority voting on CSDP, meaning that decisions reached do indeed represent an 
autonomous approach to security challenges.  
 
 4.1.2 Operationalizing strategic culture 
 
The operationalization of such a definition represents where this thesis makes its 
contribution to the discussion about the EU’s strategic culture and strategic culture 
studies as a whole. Operationalizing the concept requires specifying measures used to 
represent the broad aspects of the conceptualization. For the given definition of strategic 
culture, operationalization is accomplished in two parts. 
 
First, “actors and social groups” are operationalized as military leaders. In a way, this is 
also a further conceptualization of the term by restricting the definition to actors in the 
military domain. As a study on military leadership, this qualification was selected for its 
applicability to the research purpose. Military leaders influencing the decision-making 
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process best represent the research object based on the importance of elites in 
representing a strategic culture (Johnston 1995, Snyder 1977, Snyder 1990, and others). 
The term could have been expanded to security decision makers, but that would have 
unnecessarily broadened the scope of the thesis. By focusing on actors as military 
leaders from NATO, a cultural contrast is more readily created when they operate 
across the NATO-EU interface. Few other EU representatives have such an opportunity 
to operate both independent to, as well as within, the EU at various points in their 
careers like military officers do, often in short succession. This makes for an easier to 
identify shift in cultural influences. 
 
Military leaders are further defined here as those members of the military with 
command influence or higher policy input within the EU. The assorted below-
command-level positions in constituent militaries will continue to be socialized in their 
national strategic culture, no matter which organization they currently serve under. 
Their jobs and decision-making processes do not change based on the organization 
which issues their tasking. However, from the unit commander level up through the top 
of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and EU Military Committee (EUMC), leaders interact 
with strategic decisions and decision-making processes. The result is that such military 
commanders adequately represent the elites that are socialized in a strategic culture. 
 
Second, “norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior” are operationalized as the factors of 
3C. This study tests such an operationalization as a potential for future development of 
leadership training concerning navigating organizations with dissimilar strategic 
cultures. As Meyer noted, existing literature does “little to disaggregate the idea of 
strategic culture and provides almost no guidance on how to empirically analyze it in a 
contemporary context” (Meyer 2005, p. 524). By using 3C as a method of 
operationalizing such abstract ideas as norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior, this thesis 
offers potential utility for such a gap in empirical guidance. Additionally, such an 
operationalization provides for the necessary practical link between the concept of 
strategic culture and 3C. 
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The growing relationship and cooperation between the EU and NATO, two 
organizations that are assumed to possess differing strategic cultures, requires 
competent functionality by military leaders within both organizations. Academic work 
on strategic culture has thus far provided limited utility for those individuals conducting 
business and efficiently operating within the opposing structures. This thesis offers 3C 
as a means to better analyze such an interface. 
 
 4.2 Cross-cultural competence 
 
3C is specifically applied to the NATO-EU interface to identify any glaring 
characteristic differences in strategic culture highlighted by adapting to the EU 
environment. An operationalization, by definition, describes how an otherwise abstract 
concept is measure in a study. Here, the “norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior” are 
operationalized as 3C because the research object exists in the NATO-EU interface. 
 
It follows, then, that the degree to which 3C KSAAs are required in order to navigate 
the NATO-EU interface may be indicative of differences in strategic cultures. How the 
KSAAs are employed or prioritized may also reflect certain elements of these strategic 
cultures. By using a second concept as the operationalization for a first creates the need 
for another conceptualization and operationalization discussion about the concept of 3C. 
 
There is no shortage of explorations of 3C in the available literature. An annotated 
bibliography published by the US DoD cites more than 200 studies each concerned with 
3C in the military domain (Gallus 2014). Conceptualization of 3C has remained reliably 
consistent throughout these endeavors. The widely accepted definition of 3C in the 
military context comes from Abbe et al (2007) and is the conceptualization that this 
thesis will utilize as well. 3C is defined as the “set of knowledge, skills, and 
affect/motivation that enable individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural 
environments.”  
  
Several features of this conceptualization are worth noting as they apply to this thesis. 
Unlike in Ross et al (2010), Gabrenya et al (2012), and others, this thesis does not 
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attempt to further conceptualize “effective”, “success”, or other related notions. Doing 
so would present an unnecessary burden on the research and create validity issues which 
would detract from the overall goal of the research: to better understand how to navigate 
the NATO-EU interface. The subjective nature of these concepts is simply beyond the 
scope of this project. Furthermore, avoiding such a definition keeps this research 
aligned with the social constructivist paradigm. The actors involved are assumed to 
adjust to social constraints in order to blend with the norms and patterns of behavior in 
the new environment. Posing the interaction as a drive for “success” in competitive 
nature would invoke more of a realist or rational choice approach to the research 
problem. 
 
Additionally, this thesis assumes that the research subjects operate between two 
different (strategic) cultures and that the EU environment is the “cross-cultural 
environment” to which an individual must adapt. It therefore rules out the notion of a 
“multi-cultural officer” who may be equally versed or socialized in EU protocol and 
culture. This assumption is based on the EU as a security actor and assumes that no 
officer identifies it as their main baseline for strategic decisions. In line with this 
assumption, most officers even go as far as to identify crossing the NATO-EU interface 
as a collateral duty to their NATO responsibilities. Such an assumption is validated 
within the research by having each subject identify NATO and the EU as the 
comfortable and less comfortable cultural environment. This is a unique challenge to 
this thesis because of the multi-national qualities of the organizations. Few other 
strategic culture studies encounter the real possibility that a social actor and research 
object may be socialized in both of the strategic cultures analyzed. 
 
This conceptualization and use of strategic culture is not without its potential criticisms, 
as well. First, it may be argued that using the military-specific conceptualization of 3C 
is not a valid approach to the NATO-EU interface. Because of the bureaucratic and 
institutional characteristics of such a defense partnership, it would be reasonable to 
approach this study instead from the use of 3C in international industry. NATO and the 
EU represent two international organizations which do not fit the friend/foe 
environment envisaged by the military focus on 3C (ie., U.S. interactions in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan). NATO-EU relations may appear to better fit the organizational cross-
culture literature available concerning international industries. This study, however, 
uses the military context of 3C in order to increase the applicability and wider utility of 
the study. By relating the research outcomes to what military leaders are already taught 
in their career about 3C, it will be easier to translate lessons learned for future training 
and development. If this study leads to an improved focus on training or preparation for 
an EU military assignment, then it should build from what military leaders already learn 
elsewhere in their career. Therefore, it is imperative to utilize the military focused 
approach to 3C. 
 
The approach to 3C in this context leads this thesis to utilize the operationalization of 
3C that is most prevalent in military-focused studies. Since Ross et al (2010) proposed a 
list of nine KSAAs for successful military cross-cultural interactions, various studies 
have added new concepts, eliminated previous ones, and combined a number of them 
into various categories. The hypothesized KSAAs of these studies are presented in 
Figure 3. This thesis operationalizes 3C as the six KSAAs of self-efficacy, ethnocultural 
empathy, willingness to engage, cognitive flexibility, self-monitoring, and tolerance for 
ambiguity.  
 
 
Figure 3. The hypothesized construct of cross-cultural competence (Ross et al 2010). 
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Self-efficacy is defined as the belief in one’s own abilities to attain certain goals. An 
individual with self-efficacy believes he or she has the capabilities to execute necessary 
courses of action in order to manage difficult or complex situations. Such an individual 
has the fortitude to see a task to completion despite setbacks and challenges. It is 
important to note here the difference between self-efficacy and self-esteem. Self-esteem 
concerns one’s assessment of his or her own worth in the world. It represents how 
important and valued he or she feels in a given context. Self-efficacy, however, is a 
perception of own’s own ability to succeed. Self-efficacy manifests as traits such as 
commitment and perseverance.  
 
Ethnocultural empathy is defined as the skill to detect, consider, and analyze others’ 
views as well as their self-perception, behavior, and perception of others. This skill is 
commonly referred to in 3C literature as “perspective-taking”. An individual with 
ethnocultural empathy is able to understand the emotions and requirements of another 
person or organization by relating characteristics of the other to their own approach. 
Such a skill manifests in genuine consideration for the challenges or restrictions placed 
on another person or organization. 
 
Willingness to engage is defined as the ability to make sense of unfamiliar social 
situations in dissimilar cultures by involving oneself in the process. Similar to self-
efficacy, it is a persistence to spend time in unfamiliar cultural situations often 
associated with an openness to new experiences. Willingness to engage is a skill beyond 
the characteristics of an extrovert, and manifests as curiosity and interest in dissimilar 
cultures. 
 
Cognitive flexibility is defined as the ability to utilize a repertoire of rich mental models 
from which to choose the optimal strategy. An individual with this ability is flexible in 
his or her approach to challenges which enables him or her to solve a range of problems 
in complex situations. Such individuals have rationally reflected on previous 
experiences and known qualities to develop a range of mental models which help them 
process new situations more efficiently. Cognitive flexibility manifests as traits such as 
adaptability and innovation.  
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Self-monitoring is defined as the ability to modify behavior to comply with or 
demonstrate respect for others’ values or customs. An individual with this ability can 
observe and adjust his or her own behavior in socially (or culturally) appropriate ways 
based on situational cues. This ability is closely related to emotional self-regulation and 
self-control. Such an ability prevents emotions from interfering with performance, a 
vital attribute of a leader, and adjusting appropriately. Self-monitoring manifests in 
individuals often attributed with tact, respect, courtesy, and amiability.  
 
Tolerance for ambiguity is defined as open-mindedness in the face of confusion or 
uncertainty rather than a need for immediate closure or resolution. This term is often 
easier to explain in the negative, as an individual with a low tolerance for ambiguity. 
Such an individual has a preference for order and structure and is often reluctant to 
continue to search for a more optimal solution or way of doing things. This approach is 
often characterized by rigidity, dichotomous thinking, and ethnocentrism. A tolerance 
for ambiguity is often illustrated as indecisiveness, but in fact represents the patience 
and fortitude for complete evaluation. 
 
These six KSAAs represent the integral factors of 3C regarded in this study. Tolerance 
of ambiguity and ethnocultural empathy are regarded as antecedent variables. They are 
the inherent personal skills, the prerequisites, required for an individual to adequately 
achieve the four true cross-cultural competencies of self-efficacy, cognitive flexibility, 
willingness to engage, and self-monitoring (see Figure 3, p. 37). 
 
In summary, this thesis explores 3C as an operationalization of strategic culture by 
investigating the KSAAs (cross-cultural competencies) required to adapt to the 
necessary norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior when crossing the NATO-EU interface 
that are shared among actors and social groups (military leaders). As Figure 4 
illustrates, this study provides a unique contribution to strategic culture literature by 
examining the internal functionality of the EU’s strategic culture as it impacts the 
cultural adaptation of military leaders navigating the NATO-EU interface. 
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Figure 4. Analytic display of the theoretical framework of this thesis. The thesis presents a 
unique analysis of social actors adapting to a different strategic culture, which is significantly 
different from a majority of existing strategic culture literature. (Researcher’s own)  
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5. Methodology 
 5.1 Inductive & deductive design 
 
This thesis is a unique study in the literature by examining strategic culture from the 
perspective of its internal workings at an intimate level. Such a constrained framework 
focuses the aspects of the research design, and in turn, guides the researcher through the 
steps for sampling, investigative procedures, and analysis by consistently referring to a 
limited focus within the research question. Overall, the research design is an exploratory 
study which utilizes semi-structured elite interviews to provide inductive validity and 
concept expansion to a previously deductively compiled operationalization. 
 
The research question does little to automatically limit the scope of possible research, 
and in many ways, it is easier to speak of what this thesis does not cover rather than 
what it does. It is not the intention to analyze or classify EU strategic culture in its 
entirety. The aim is to contribute to both the fields of strategic culture and 3C within the 
appropriate scope of an MA thesis. By adding 3C to the research problem, it further 
constrains the framework of the thesis because it is not looking at the entire list of 
requirements to adapt to the EU’s strategic culture. It disregards administrative and 
institutional factors in favor of the personal-level behavioral norms that are required. 
Such a framework dictates the aspects of sampling and instrumentation discussed 
below.  
 
As a means to explore the relevance of 3C as it applies to operationalizing strategic 
culture, this thesis draws on limited precedence in the field. The most similar previous 
study was conducted by Ross (2008) as the U.S. Army set out to operationalize 3C for 
future military training and evaluation. As the goal of this thesis is to provide insight 
into how to best prepare for an assignment within the NATO-EU interface, it is logical 
that it will share similarities to the Ross study. Specifically, this study takes both an 
inductive and deductive approach to 3C. The literature review in the fields of strategic 
culture and 3C are thorough and sought to identify the most compelling factors of the 
3C construct. This deductive approach allows for focused attention on the military-
specific application of 3C which is already prevalent in NATO training curricula for 
  41 
military commanders. However, a potential contribution of this thesis is to identify 
anywhere that the literature fails to explain the cross-cultural dynamic of the NATO-EU 
interface. For this, an inductive approach is also required. 
 
The inductive approach to 3C in the EU-NATO interface increases the validity and 
adequacy of the 3C factors in the particular relationship. First, it allows the researcher to 
test the applicability of the inductively determined KSAAs for interacting in a cross-
cultural environment as it applies to the NATO-EU interface. The list of six KSAAs 
derived from previous literature serve as the initial benchmark of 3C. When analyzing a 
particular cross-cultural interaction, these factors will be particularly scrutinized to 
better assess how much value each provides to understanding the cultural interaction. 
Second, an inductive approach also allows for the identification of previously unnoticed 
or disregarded KSAAs which play a role in the NATO-EU interface. The researcher 
may identify unique factors essential for overcoming cultural differences between two 
different strategic cultures or determine a new precedence of 3C factors that is unique to 
a divide in strategic cultures. The inductive approach is accomplished through semi-
structured elite interviews, as described in the instrumentation section below.  
 
The cases examined consist of those particular military leaders who have encountered 
the NATO-EU interface, and not those who observe or interact with them. It does not 
ask EU professionals to comment second-hand on the adaptation of a military officer to 
an EU role in their institution. Additionally, this study is not concerned with similar 
transitions between strategic cultures in more general terms, such as exchange program 
officers or commanders within joint task forces because the NATO-EU interface is most 
applicable to the modern context and debate. Possibilities for future study exist in taking 
a broader approach to multinational leadership across strategic culture boundaries, but 
this study looks specifically at the NATO-EU interface. Within this case, there are 
potential subcases as well, depending on where or who the officer worked for within the 
EU. It may be tempting to investigate the differences between cultural adjustment 
required to be seconded into the EUMS compared to an EU operational command, for 
example. This thesis, however, remains a general investigation of officers navigating 
the NATO-EU interface.  
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The thesis takes a case-oriented approach and performs cross-case analysis as opposed 
to a variable-oriented approach. As such, it values interpretive synthesis over strict 
analysis by inspecting relevant data for themes and components which improve the 
understanding of cross-cultural interactions. Those elements are then rebuilt into an 
“ordered whole”, and applied to the appropriate social context which is, in this case, a 
military leader crossing the NATO-EU interface (Denzin 2001). Cross-case analysis 
improves the generalizability of the study, with certain precautions. By examining 
multiple cases, understanding and explanation is deepened and aids the researcher in 
forming more general categories of how certain factors are related.   
 
 5.2 Sampling for diverse experiences within the interface 
 
The first sampling decision made in this research was to bound the case to military 
commanders involved with the decision-making process at the unit commander level 
and above. The sub-unit commander or officer, the strike officer on a destroyer for 
example, does not make strategic decisions and is therefore not required to adapt to a 
different role when operating on an EU or NATO mission. Unit commanders and above, 
including those on EU staffs, must adapt to the strategic environment presented by their 
assignment. Such a well-developed conceptualization of the case to be studied naturally 
guides the initial conditions for further sampling decisions. This thesis’ aim is to 
achieve analytic generality by seeking comparable data for cross-case comparability in 
order to get a better idea of the underlying core constructs and factors at play across all 
cases. 
 
To avoid excessively narrow sampling, this thesis investigates a broad range of cases 
within the constraints of the conceptualization. This includes diverse viewpoints of 
recently retired officers (within the past 2 years) as well as unit commanders in 
operations and staff headquarters outside of Brussels. Each instance, or setting, of the 
NATO-EU interface will share some properties with all other cases, some properties 
with some other cases, and some properties with no other cases. By compiling the 
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similarities, it makes the findings more generic and improves generalizability to the 
overall NATO-EU interface.  
 
Including in the case sampling are officers representing non-EU allied nations in 
NATO. Although it is, of course, more likely for an officer from an EU nation to 
interact more closely with the EU on various operations or staffs, it is important to also 
include in the sample pool non-EU officers. Strategic cultural differences between 
NATO and the EU may be even more pronounced for non-EU partners, especially from 
North America, and such a contrasted perspective serves to better fulfill the desire to 
sample from the entire NATO-EU interface. 
 
This thesis employs a small sample size in order to achieve more in-depth study. The 
sample is set to 7 cases, which is much smaller than alternative quantitative or even 
some qualitative approaches. Because of the small number of cases to be analyzed in 
intimate detail, sampling in this thesis is done purposively rather than random. The 
purposive sampling performed is theory-driven. Sampling is done to select a small 
number of representative cases covering the entire NATO-EU interface to include unit 
commanders on EU operations, Operational Headquarters Staffs outside of Brussels, as 
well as the EUMS and cooperation efforts between NATO and the European Defense 
Agency. This provides for generalizations that are more likely to apply to EU strategic 
culture as a whole, and therefore be more applicable to any officer encountering the 
NATO-EU interface. 
 
Beyond the purposive sampling across the NATO-EU spectrum of military 
relationships, convenience sampling was further employed. The focus through 
convenience sampling was to focus on the time, resources, and access available to a 
single researcher conducting an MA thesis. As such, personal connections were utilized 
to reach the highest leadership levels possible (the ‘most elite’ elites socialized in the 
strategic culture) for case analysis, and operational unit commanders were selected from 
the current class of the senior leadership course at Baltic Defence College in Tartu, 
Estonia. Because there is such a large pool of officers with experience operating as a 
unit commander under the EU, sampling from the Baltic Defence College is assumed to 
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be a random selection of that representative sample. Of course, convenience sampling 
creates a set of potential biases by linking personal networking to the case selection. It 
is possible that the sample may only include like-minded individuals, or those who are 
not disenchanted with their experience in NATO and the EU. Individuals willing to sit 
for interviews, at some level, believe that there is knowledge to be passed on and 
lessons to be learned about this scenario. This criticism and potential bias is noted, and 
was minimized in case selection by achieving three interviews by means of “cold 
calling” officers outside of the researcher’s personal network who fit the sampling 
criteria (Cases 2, 3, and 7). 
 
 5.3 Semi-structured elite interviews 
 
The most effective instrumentation method for cultural analysis is likely ethnography, 
as noted from the researcher’s previous experience. The goal for analysis is to observe 
and record as many details about the nature of how an officer must adapt to the NATO-
EU interface via norms, ideas, and patterns of behavior. However, in the scope of such a 
project as this thesis, the time, resources, and access present an insurmountable obstacle 
to effectively executing an ethnographic research design. The research question 
concerns how one adapts to the EU environment points the researcher to semi-structured 
interviews. This thesis applies 3C principles from previous studies to strategic culture, 
but also searches for new elements as well. Semi-structured interviews are used to 
accomplish both of these tasks. 
 
Two key challenges are shared amongst 3C studies which employ semi-structured 
interviews within their methodology. First, there is often ambiguity involved with 
classifying a variable either as an antecedent to 3C, a personality trait, or a factor of the 
construct itself (Trejo et al. 2015, p. 277). An interview subject will infrequently 
distinguish between a skill or ability employed to adapt to a different environment and a 
personality aspect which they use to approach all problems. Recent 3C research has 
found a breakthrough in this regard by using Task-Analysis models which focus on 
specific behavioral examples (ibid.). In a Task-Analysis interview, the researcher asks 
the interviewee to identify specific behavioral examples that are essential to job 
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performance. This is accomplished by having the subject describe what his or her tasks 
entailed and how they were performed. With a focus on the behavioral aspects, the 
dissimilarity between antecedent and factor becomes clearer. 
 
Second, interview-based 3C studies rely on critical incident narratives. These critical 
incidents often serve as the focal point for an interviewee to describe the strengths and 
weaknesses demonstrated in one particular cross-cultural interaction. This serves as the 
basis of the narrative provided in the interview. In a partnership like NATO and the EU, 
it is more difficult to identify critical incidents. Interviewees typically interacted on a 
slower and longer-term basis with the EU’s strategic culture. This is a more nuanced 
‘incident’ for example, than an interaction between a local and soldier in Afghanistan, 
the scenario for which the critical incident narrative technique was developed. As a 
substitute, this thesis begins with the interviewee’s first impression of the EU as a 
cooperative partner. This serves to highlight the point where EU norms, ideas, and 
patterns of behavior were less familiar to the subject than after prolonged exposure to 
the culture.  
 
Pre-screening criteria for interview subjects was developed in accordance with the 
sampling decisions previously discussed. Selection for interviews was supported by 
asking potential subjects if all of the following statements apply: 
1. You have had at least one role as a unit commander or above in which you 
interacted directly with the EU as a security and defense actor. 
2. Your role forced you to interact with the EU regularly. 
3. You have experience in NATO as a unit commander or above. 
4. You believe you have gained some level of competence in understanding 
how to interact with the EU in the military domain. 
5. You have first-hand experience with decision-making in the EU 
environment. 
6. You are comfortable openly discussing in an unclassified (UNCLAS) forum, 
in English, your thoughts on such topics. Anonymity will be maintained. 
 
  46 
The interview guide (Appendix C) was developed by the researcher prior to the first 
interview and was consistently updated based on lessons learned about the order, 
wording, and applicability of certain questions. It is important to note that interview 
questions did not use wording such as “do well”, “effective”, or “success” because 
conceptualization of these terms was not made for this study. The distinction of 
“success” was avoided, or the interview subject was allowed to make his or her own 
conclusions about the quality of interactions or adaptation. Interview questions, instead, 
focused on influence or understanding in order to avoid validity issues concerning the 
use of “successful adaptation” to the EU strategic culture. Additionally, interviews were 
transcribed on Microsoft Word and then transferred to MAXQDA for storing the data. 
 
The interview process began with an overview of the project and an explanation of the 
informed consent form (Appendix B). Necessary background information was collected 
for the subjects and recorded in the interview matrix (Appendix A). Once permission to 
begin recording was obtained, the interview guide was followed by the researcher in a 
semi-structured format, meaning that flexibility was provided for topics previously 
discussed, or a mention of a later topic within an earlier answer, in addition to further 
probes. 
 
Probes of 3C factors were accomplished by two different approaches. First, in some 
cases the research question was asked directly of the participant. This took the form of 
“how did you have to adjust to the environment in the EU?” It has been acknowledged 
in most previous 3C studies that 3C factors are very difficult to identify in self-reporting 
scenarios. Interview subjects have difficulty identifying behavioral characteristics they 
employed to deal with a cross-cultural situation. This study found the same results. 
Instead, the researcher substituted a question that required the same reflection but 
avoided the natural bias of a self-reported characteristic. Better answers were provided 
when the interview subject was asked to provide advice for a less experienced officer 
about to take on the same role. 
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5.4 Coding & interpretive analysis 
 
This thesis applied content analysis techniques to the interview transcript data obtained 
from the interviews. Data analysis was performed concurrently with data collection in 
order to reflect on existing data and refine strategies for collecting more applicable data 
in further interviews. Transcription into MAXQDA and processing the data as samples 
of text meant that the words recorded were the data analyzed and not the tone or body 
language of the interviewee. This can be difficult to analyze as the only source of data 
and is especially difficult when dealing with non-native English speakers who may not 
be very comfortable expounding on topics such as cultural adaptation in English. 
Certainly, some of the nuance of the data was lost simply by the selection of the analytic 
method for data processing.  
 
In content analysis, codes were applied to the text data in order to identify the most 
critical aspects related to the research questions. As Saldaña (2016, p. 5) noted, coding 
is primarily an interpretive act. A code can sometimes summarize, distill, or condense 
the data instead of simply reducing them to appropriate categories. The First Cycle 
coding was done in order to identify the 3C factors operationalized within the 
Theoretical Framework of this thesis, and also for other ideas or behaviors related to 
cultural adjustment. These initial codes serve as prompts for deeper reflection in later 
analysis. 
 
Much like the nature of this study, codes were also developed both inductively and 
deductively. Deductive codes were used as a provisional “start list” from the conceptual 
framework of the study. Key variables were identified both in general terms and their 
manifestations as indicated by previous studies. It is easier for the researcher to identify 
the manifestations of the 3C factors as behavioral nouns (eg. “curiosity” instead of 
“willingness to engage”, “patience” instead of “tolerance of ambiguity”, etc). 
Furthermore, inductive coding was used to investigate beyond the given 3C framework 
of cultural interaction. Induced codes emerge progressively during data collection. In 
this case, the researcher sought strategies for cross-cultural interaction which did not fit 
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the conceptualized dimensions of the 3C construct. It is possible that certain unique 
factors play a role in the NATO-EU interface.  
 
A code book was maintained and contained clear operational definitions of each code 
used (Appendix D). The code book is the most important factor for replicability of the 
study, especially when considering that this research did not have the resources 
available for verified coding with a second (or more) researcher. Definitions within the 
code book were fine tuned to reduce ambiguity for coding and differentiating between 
similar factors. Despite the fact that coding was done by one researcher, reliability was 
increased by second and third attempts at coding unmarked copies of the data after more 
than 5 days away from it. An 85% match standard was applied to such repeated coding 
efforts in order to ensure that the biases of a single researcher were reduced.  
 
First Cycle coding utilized three specific techniques. First, holistic coding was 
performed to provide descriptive codes of the overall contents within the data. Certain 
notable categories and general terms were used in order to focus coding on relevant data 
in the future. Some aspects of the interviews did not directly apply to the cross-cultural 
interaction sought by this study. Second, In Vivo coding was used to identify words or 
short phrases directly from the language of the data. This honored the participants voice 
and allowed the researcher to better identify how certain 3C factors may appear in later 
data. Third, emotion coding was used to identify the interpersonal interactions and the 
perspectives of the interview subject. These emotional factors are indicative of a 
learning process, and therefore point to specific areas where cross-cultural adaptation 
may have occurred. Finally, provisional coding was used to deliberately analyze the 
data with the operationalized factors directly in mind. Provisional coding is especially 
applicable to studies which build on previous research, as this thesis builds on the works 
of Ross (2008, 2010). The list of 6 KSAAs was used for guided analysis of the data, but 
was also revised, modified, deleted, and expanded as necessary when going through the 
coding process.  
 
Once each first cycle method was thoroughly completed, the researcher was faced with 
a vast number of various emotions, skills, and actions that were identified as part of the 
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cultural adaptation process. Second cycle coding was used to consolidate these codes 
into general categories of 3C in order to condense the data into smaller analytic units. 
By doing so, the researcher was able to identify certain data which stood out enough to 
be coded in the first cycle but did not appropriately fit with a larger category. These 
types of data forced the researcher to consider whether they represented an additional 
factor of 3C not represented within the assumed 6 KSAAs. 
 
Finally, pattern codes (second cycle) were transferred to general patterns in both 
narrative and matrix form. Both methods selected are a type of data analysis in their 
own right by choosing to present the data in a certain way. Narrative description of the 
noted patterns is presented in the Results section of this thesis which allows for a more 
nuanced explanation of what the researcher found in the data. The matrix form (Table 
1), represents how the factors of 3C appeared within each interview. The matrix 
presentation of the data is most similar to previous 3C studies, specifically Ross (2008, 
2010). 
 
In summary, the methodology of this case-oriented study employed semi-structured 
elite interviews across multiple cases to better understand the research question as it was 
appropriately constrained by concise conceptualizations. Content analysis was then used 
to code the data and identify consistent patterns relevant to the necessary norms, ideas, 
and patterns of behavior for adapting to a cross-cultural situation. 
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6. Results & Analysis 
 
“You are certainly asking military officers to deal in the department of state, in a beast that they have 
never been used to dealing with before. So, it is a big shock, and I think that presents some big 
problems.” 
- Case 2 
 
The fieldwork for this study was accomplished in February and March 2019. Seven 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who fulfilled the sampling 
criteria and is reflected in the interview matrix (Appendix A). All interviewees had been 
assigned roles in their military careers which dealt directly with both the EU and 
NATO. The interview sample consisted of four officers remaining on active duty and 
three of whom are retired. Included in the sample were also two representatives from 
non-EU NATO countries, both from the United States. Overall, five interviewees were 
naval officers and two were from the army. This variation derives from the operational 
distinction between the two services. Finding a unit commander with operational 
experience on an EU mission means looking to EU naval missions. With Operation 
Sophia and Operation Atalanta, naval commanders represent the current perspective on 
strategic military operations (not peace-keeping) under the EU flag. 
 
Access to interviewees, and trust in the research topic, was supported by the 
researcher’s own background. A tone of mutual understanding was quickly established 
in each interview as the researcher presented himself as a naval lieutenant conducting 
research on a prestigious exchange scholarship program. The fact that the researcher 
comes from the United States and has no EU military experience also improved the 
content of the interviews. Subjects could therefore focus on explaining their experiences 
in the EU, specifically what was new or different, without the need to explain the 
military intricacies of their roles or NATO background.  
 
Research data (interview transcripts) were stored in MAXQDA. Processing the data for 
each case required significant interpretive analysis. Because the semi-structured 
interviews were not a strict survey in question-answer format, much more interpretive 
analysis of what was said, and what was not said, was required from the researcher.  
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Two main perspectives were present in each interview: the advice perspective and the 
task analysis perspective. The difference in how the data was presented, and in what 
way the 3C KSAAs appeared, varied depending on which perspective the subject was 
speaking from. An advice perspective had the potential to highlight a KSAA as it would 
manifest in behavior. This represents the clearest allusion to such a KSAA. The task 
analysis perspective, however, required almost an inverse interpretation by the 
researcher. For example, interview data concerning a frustration or particularly 
challenging aspect do not explicitly refer to a particular KSAA, since KSAAs are 
assumed to be beneficial behaviors which relieve such frustrations. It is up to the 
researcher to interpret which KSAA or KSAAs would best satisfy the challenge 
expressed within the data. Such a contrast makes it difficult to generalize all interview 
data together as an entire set and reinforces the methodology of thorough case-oriented 
analysis before applying cross-case analysis.  This highlights the interpretive process 
taken on by the researcher to achieve a complete understanding of the data available as 
it applied to leadership lessons learned and best practices.  
 
Each of the seven interview subjects had completed varying degrees of reflection on 
their EU leadership experience. Therefore, the depth and quality of understanding 
varied between interviews. Some of the most applicable data came from descriptions of 
experiences and individual adjustments to the EU environment, typically in the task 
analysis perspective. Other rich data existed in passing on advice to future leaders in the 
advice perspective. Which perspective created better data, the researcher found, speaks 
to the amount the interview subject had previously reflected on similar topics. Many of 
the interview subjects, it is worth noting, were not very cross-culturally competent by 
their own admission, just as Ross (2010) had found with her interview subjects. 
Therefore, the findings are not directly an analysis of their expertise in cross-cultural 
interactions between NATO and the EU, but rather an analysis of observations from a 
range of officers about the nature and challenges of the NATO-EU interface. The 
researcher was responsible for determining what, from these observations and 
experiences, constitutes cross-cultural competence or causes such competence to 
develop.  
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Interpretive analysis was performed consistent with the constructivist paradigm of the 
research design. The researcher specifically assessed the behavioral aspects of the 
subjects’ experiences. Although expressed opinion was considered as relevant data in 
each interview when the question asked created an opportunity for such reflection, 
interpretive analysis instead focused on the narrative description of the experience. The 
narrative provided a better opportunity to assess how each subject made their 
adjustment because of prevailing social influences. Opinions, especially those expressed 
by military officers, tend to be rational and driven by goal accomplishment. Analysis 
here instead focused on finding the social integration factors which would be inherent in 
a strategic culture.  
 
For example, the integrated approach of a job in the EU was described in Case 2. He 
described an environment, forced by both the need for consensus and small-actor role of 
the military, of constant interaction with a diversity of policy actors. It required him, 
unlike in any previous role, to physically visit different offices within the EU for 
meetings and discussions with other policy actors. Such behavior of interaction and 
involvement was required in order to function within “the elaborate nature of the EU”, 
and not necessarily as part of a rational pursuit of mission accomplishment. This portion 
of data was then coded as “Willingness to Engage” because it highlighted the social 
need to participate in diverse discussions for fear of being “left out of the conversation 
and having the military’s role defined for us.”  
 
6.1 Case-by-case analysis 
 
The data are presented here in narrative form as individual case summaries which 
identify and elaborate on the pattern codes. Such prosaic representation of the data 
provides valuable context to the findings. Table 1, the matrix form summary, identifies 
the number of instances each hypothesized KSAA was coded in the data. Additionally, 
a percentage of overall stress given to each KSAA is calculated. This approach aims to 
mediate the inbalance of a single passing reference and a long, passionate description by 
applying a weighting factor which can be represented in matrix form. The cross-case 
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total occurrences is not represented in percentages because of the varying length and 
style of interview subjects. Because one subject tends to go into more descriptive detail 
than another means that such an overall calculation is not comparable. 
 
Interviews are classified by whether the interview subject dealt with the NATO-EU 
interface on the strategic/staff level or the operational/unit commander level. What is 
missing from Table 1 is an appreciation for the true weighting associated with each 
mention of a KSAA. Even with the percentage calculation provided, little knowledge is 
achieved from such a matrix construction. This weakness is common to most previous 
3C studies, as well. The narrative explanation intends to provide necessary interpretive 
explanations because the results in Table 1 are also be a function of the questions asked 
during the interview, the topics covered in the interview, and not necessarily the 
importance of a particular factor. 
 
Table 1. Cross-cultural competence factor occurrences in interview data (and as a percentage 
of overall 3C coded excerpts in each case) 
Case Operational/ Strategic 
Self-
efficacy 
Ethnocultural 
Empathy 
Willingness 
to Engage 
Cognitive 
Flexibility 
Self-
monitoring 
Tolerance 
for 
Ambiguity 
1 Strategic 0 (0) 
8 
(38) 
3 
(30) 
4 
(20) 
1 
(7) 
1 
(5) 
2 Strategic 7 (9) 
9 
(22) 
10 
(31) 
4 
(9) 
5 
(9) 
2 
(20) 
3 Strategic 1 (9) 
3 
(19) 
2 
(27) 
5 
(45) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
4 Operational 0 (0) 
1 
(12) 
1 
(21) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(4) 
5 
(63) 
5 Operational 2 (10) 
1 
(2) 
1 
(5) 
2 
(20 ) 
1 
(5) 
8 
(58) 
6 Operational 6 (40) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(27) 
1 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(26) 
7 Strategic 1 (2) 
1 
(22) 
6 
(43) 
1 
(7) 
2 
(9) 
3 
(14) 
 Total: 17 23 27 17 10 23 
 
Case 1 consisted of a non-EU NATO officer with significant experience operating on 
NATO staffs in cooperation with the EU. His impression of the NATO-EU relationship 
can be characterized as improving from “adversarial” to “more cooperative” over the 
past few years. Part of this perspective is manifest in a negative attitude towards the 
confusion associated with compensating for “EU weakness”. The most significant 
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KSAA to appear in this case was ethnocultural empathy. This stemmed from an 
unwillingness to interact in cooperative assignments based on a failure to understand the 
shortcomings or limitations on the EU. Although cooperation, he acknowledged, would 
be rational and beneficial, he described a “stand off” resulting from a lack of empathy 
between the two sides. An improved understanding of the goals and limitations of the 
other culture, through the ability to take on the EU’s perspective of cooperation, would 
serve to alleviate some of the challenges identified in this interview.  
 
Additionally, this interview stressed a need for more fluid and open communications 
between the two organizations, emphasizing the necessity of a willingness to engage. 
He described a failure of the EU to reciprocate a liaison position at another NATO 
office separate from his own. Due to the social pressures within NATO, that perception 
permeated into his office and spurred the “adversarial” nature of his relationship with 
the EU. This is more of a reflection of the “closed ranks” culture within NATO, 
especially between national compatriots, but highlights the need for both organizations 
to participate in one another’s endeavors in order to build trust and confidence through 
increased exposure.  
 
Case 2 represents the case where the most prior reflection had been done about the 
NATO-EU interface. The subject was a former Deputy Director General of the EUMS 
and represented an insightful perspective on adjusting to the dynamics of the EU. He 
described encountering the NATO-EU interface as a broadening experience. “I think 
there was a degree of naiveté in the way NATO operates, which I didn’t realize until I 
got to the EU.” Each hypothesized KSAA was alluded to throughout the data, but the 
strongest indicator was a willingness to engage. This was evident from the strong push 
to advocate for exposure to the EU system by becoming involved in the process. He 
worked to create a 6-month internship for junior officers to familiarize themselves with 
the EU processes, “to just get a smell of the place.” This arose from frustration he had 
with his more junior personnel’s lack of understanding of the EU structure. The 
bureaucratic nature of the EU created “career functionnaires” which forced the 
seconded national experts, especially in the military, into the role of naïve apprentices 
on navigating the mammoth structure. He felt earlier exposure could shift the power 
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dynamic in these conversations and negotiations with more knowledgeable officers 
comfortable in the EU structure. 
 
He also described the benefits of leaving the office to go meet and interact with the 
other levers of power in the EU. Simply put, an officer’s role in NATO does not require 
such cross-policy negotiation but taking the proverbial ‘seat at the table’ is the way of 
influencing policy in the EU. Such an approach, he argued, would also lead to “the 
necessary realization that we [NATO] are not profound to all knowledge”.  
 
The second most significant KSAA expressed within Case 2 is tolerance for ambiguity. 
He explained the personal patience that is required to endure the EU process, which is 
often long-term. He described learning the approach of not overworking the problem to 
find a solution quickly, and specifically the benefits of that approach in dealing with the 
long-term impact of the EU’s missions in and around Somalia. The EU functions and 
decides at a different speed than he was used to, which required adjustment. 
Ethnocultural empathy was nearly equally emphasized as the ability to take on the EU’s 
perspective. “NATO,” he explained, “operates at extremes requiring military 
interventions, but normal people do not live in extremes”. A military officer must be 
able to take on the civilian nation-building perspective and considerations in order to 
better relate to the EU’s military tasks. In inter-agency negotiations as well, this 
empathy serves to help an officer better frame his or her negotiations relative to other 
voices. Holistically, this interview represented the most congruent view of the NATO-
EU interface as a cross-cultural interaction requiring the entire spectrum of cross-
cultural competence.  
 
Case 3 consisted of another non-EU NATO officer who was directly responsible for 
high-level project coordination with the EU. Consistently referred to in his words as the 
need to be adaptable, the strongest KSAA apparent in this case was cognitive flexibility. 
This was presented as the ability to consider the capabilities and requirements of the EU 
as opposed to a “single minded” NATO track. Specific experiences in this case 
concerned innovation and cooperation leading to mutually beneficial outcomes as a 
result of weighing the possible solutions of a particular challenge. Specifically, he 
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sighted how smoothly his EU counterparts balanced their national and supranational 
responsibilities. He found himself taking longer to understand the perspectives of 
various security institutions, like NATO and the EU, by viewing them as separate from 
his role in the US Army. Coordinating with the EU, he explained, required more 
constant synthesizing of the various perspectives. Rich mental models of how to 
approach challenges will allow for the flexibility and adaptability of an officer in 
considering possible solutions.  
 
To acquire these mental models, however, requires a strong willingness to engage in 
order to learn about the EU’s processes. One root cause for a lack of mental models 
appears to be a lack of experience in handling national and supranational interests 
simultaneously. This creates the necessity for officers to serve in multinational 
environments in order to better develop appropriate mental models for cooperation. 
 
Case 4 involved a unit commander with recent SNMG2 experience as well as 
experience in Operation Atalanta. The recurring KSAA within this data was tolerance 
for ambiguity. He described the frustrations of adapting to Atalanta due to less 
solidified objectives and directives. He found significant room for interpretation of EU 
policy among various units conducting Atalanta, which made unit cohesion more 
difficult to maintain. Specifically, he noted how the EU adopted NATO procedures and 
protocols for its own missions. However, the EU versions were written less succinctly 
and with less actionable direction. This caused a feeling of uneasiness that he would not 
operate exactly aligned with the EU’s vision. He encountered less cohesion among 
fellow unit commanders because of this ambiguity. The EU, in fact, allows for more 
nuanced interpretation from unit commanders rather than the lock-step alignment found 
in NATO. This approach certainly requires adjustment for military commanders. He, in 
turn, preferred his work in SNMG2 based on the clarity and unity of the missions. 
Because the military unit played a smaller role in the overall objective of Atalanta 
compared to an SNMG2 operation, it was necessary to wait for more long-term 
objective achievement in the face of uncertainty.  
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Case 5 similarly stressed the need for tolerance for ambiguity from a unit commander. 
His experience as a unit commander in NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and as 
flagship commander for the EU’s Operation Sophia created a useful contrast. Down to 
the details of the tasking, he noted that NATO’s structure and clarity is formatted with 
bullet point and clear direction. The EU’s directives “read like a book or story.” Again, 
the unit commander plays a smaller role in an EU mission. Compared to Ocean Shield 
where his responsibilities covered tactical and some political duties, he found that less 
responsibility was given to unit commanders in the EU mission. His role was more 
scripted and added “that is frustrating. It’s belittling.” He did recognize the need for 
patience and the slower pace with which Sophia objectives are achieved emphasizing 
that capacity building is a slow process. This perspective is very similar to that found in 
Case 4, in feeling that there is more he should be doing to support the success of the 
overall mission.  
 
In relating his experience in a perceived “background role” throughout his time in 
Operation Sophia, he also described an expectation that he be prepared to respond at 
any moment. This came through strongly as a need for cognitive flexibility. The EU 
decision-making process is slow and focused on consensus building. However, he 
explained that once a decision to move forward was achieved, there was swift demand 
on him to provide operational possibilities and recommendations. This required broad 
mental models built from previous experiences to quickly and effectively determine the 
optimal course of action. The root cause, it appeared, was the EU’s expectation that 
once consensus was reached on a proposed action, then the military would immediately 
be ready to respond.  
 
Case 6 emphasized the personal commitment necessary to navigate the NATO-EU 
interface. The case consisted of a background as a prior unit commander in NATO 
taking an operational role at Operation Atalanta Headquarters. The most telling factor 
in this case was self-efficacy. He asserted, “As long as I can take my own approach and 
my own way of doing things, then I am sure that wherever I am going or what I am 
doing then I have something to contribute.” Such a personal confidence and belief in 
one’s own abilities allows for the perseverance and commitment to overcome certain 
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hurdles to integration within the EU system. What he described at Atalanta headquarters 
was an environment of nationally-minded individuals lacking true team-like cohesion. 
The social situation of isolation and distrust forced him to trust his own operational 
competence more than he had done in the past. He characterized the EU staff as 
exhibiting less initiative for cooperation than he had encountered in previous 
assignments. This requires an officer to draw less on the collective momentum of those 
around him and more on his own determination. This is where self-efficacy proves 
vitally important. 
 
Similarly, he also reflected on the willingness to engage. An officer involved in the EU 
decision-making process must take on the responsibility to “knock on doors and talk to 
people” in order to better understand how they best fit in to the system. In the same 
description about an isolated social environment, it became clear that his personal 
initiative led to developing camaraderie and cohesion on the staff. In such a social 
environment, it seems that self-efficacy certainly spurred personal expansion into a 
willingness to engage. This calls into question the assumption of self-efficacy as a 3C 
component factor rather than an antecedent variable (see Figure 3, p. 37). This finding is 
elaborated on at the end of section 6.2.  
 
Case 7 represents the case with the most experience at the highest level of NATO-EU 
cooperation. He served as a division chief on the EU Military Staff, and then as an 
Assistant Secretary General of NATO for policy and planning. The subject was able to 
speak to deep experience in navigating the NATO-EU interface in both directions, and 
efforts to “teach” EU integration upon his return to NATO. He regards learning to 
operate within the EU as “a particular challenge for a military officer who was not 
trained and educated in this regard.” The recommended approach to this challenge takes 
the form of a willingness to engage. He stressed the importance of seeking out 
opportunities to interact with the EU in order to better learn the intricacies and focus of 
EU missions. He described a security environment in the EU where military voices are 
not always the most relied upon or even heard. In order to adapt to that institutional 
prioritization, it benefits officers to gain experience within the decision-making 
structure. Not because it is an inferior system, but because it requires deeper 
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understanding than a military commander would typically have of EU decision-making 
on security matters. Such an open approach to cooperation will lead a military officer 
“to recognize and understand that the focus in the EU, when it comes to supporting 
partners and other nations, is a primarily civilian or political responsibility.” The 
different type of objectives held by the EU, from what a NATO officer might be used 
to, requires deliberate engagement in order to better understand the strategic objectives.  
 
The second factor most prevalent in this case was ethnocultural empathy. This case 
represented the most nuanced explanation of the role of ethnocultural empathy required 
for integration. Much of this coding overlapped with willingness to engage, as well. He 
described a general assumption he believed most NATO officers held in their first 
interaction with the EU: that CSDP structures were weaker, less effective, and more 
poorly organized, than similar structures in NATO. This only exacerbated the 
“adversarial” relationship between the two institutions. His leadership responsibility 
entailed encouraging those under him to take an empathetic approach to the 
organizations’ differences, by explaining, “There is also an emotional side to it [NATO-
EU cooperation] …I stressed the importance of trustful, collegiate relationships with 
our counterparts.” Improved emotional understanding form both sides led to more 
productive cooperation on policy issues. 
 
6.2 Cross-case analysis 
 
Three specific findings are clear when conducting cross-case analysis of the entire data 
set. First, that there is a general trend throughout each case to emphasize a willingness 
to engage. Second, that tolerance for ambiguity is particularly necessary at the unit 
commander level. Finally, that the impact of the two previously mentioned KSAAs 
(willingness to engage and tolerance for ambiguity) may be enhanced through ‘regional 
specific’ training on the EU. The 3C principles derived from the deductive approach in 
this research were confirmed within the data. The inductive analysis did not identify any 
new or additional KSAAs for consideration to improve the 3C model. This fact lends 
further credibility to the 3C model derived from the literature in the deductive portion of 
this study. However, it is recommended that the hypothesized structure of the 3C 
construct be slightly altered to include self-efficacy as a gateway variable. 
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The most significant KSAA to approaching the NATO-EU interface is embracing a 
willingness to engage. This particular factor was readily prevalent in each case analyzed 
and signified the most consistent trend across all cases. Willingness to engage takes the 
form of an open-minded approach to the unknown entity, in this case the EU. The factor 
is epitomized by seeking out opportunities for interaction in order to develop better 
familiarity with the EU as an institution.  It is assumed that greater exposure to EU 
structures and operations will result in improved integration and functionality when 
working for and with the EU. It can be concluded from the data that a military officer 
must not approach the EU as a continuation of other military-related jobs he or she may 
have held in the past. Instead, what is required is a willingness to engage with an open-
mind and acknowledge that the EU presents a different challenge than ‘business as 
normal’ for a military assignment in order to improve understanding and integration 
within a new role.  
 
So, what does this trend of willingness to engage across all cases mean for the NATO-
EU interface? First and foremost, that NATO-EU cooperation will only improve with 
more interpersonal cooperation. Military officers must seek out opportunities to interact 
with the EU as a professional organization in order to actually spend time within the 
NATO-EU interface and gain from that experience. A common refrain from military 
officers about intra-organization cooperation is that each much “stick to its own swim 
lane”, meaning not to interfere with the other organization’s requirements. This attitude 
is contrary to a willingness to engage and creates an environment of minimal 
interaction. Instead, officers must be eager to understand NATO and the EU by 
observing the process from an integrated perspective. This is the very definition of 
willingness to engage. A recurrent concern from the NATO perspective is that the EU 
represents a rival defense organization competing with NATO for time and resources. 
The EU is, in fact, a different type of international organization than NATO with 
different priorities and goals than military officers have dealt with previously in their 
careers. An officer who navigates the NATO-EU interface must not assume that the 
same strategies, behavioral norms, and practices apply, but must eagerly seek out the 
opportunity to better understand the EU. 
  61 
 
The second readily apparent trend through the entire data set is the relative significance 
of tolerance for ambiguity to unit commanders. Unit commanders, especially naval 
commanding officers, are used to a degree of autonomy in their tasking. They are 
accustomed to being self-reliant when it comes to accomplishing the mission. In 5,000 
years of naval warfare, it is only very recently that communication with ships at sea, and 
between ships at sea, has even become possible. This is the historical foundation of 
where the independent, autonomous commanding officer derives. The EU represents a 
comprehensive, civilian-focused approach to security and defense challenges, and the 
military plays a specialized role among many different levers of power. It is natural, 
therefore, that military tasking will be narrower in scope than typical military directives 
from NATO or national entities. The types of missions which the EU undertakes 
militarily, typically monitoring and security missions, seem less involved to a unit 
commander who is used to managing the entire spectrum of operations from his or her 
command. As was explained in Case 2, “When you come to the EU, …the military’s 
influence…has got to be played in a completely different way. You cannot just lead 
from the front on this like you do in NATO.” Therefore, in order to navigate the NATO-
EU interface, a unit commander must be more accepting of uncertainty and limited 
clarity while having the patience to carry-out the type of tasking required by the EU. 
 
So, what does a need for increased tolerance for ambiguity mean to a military officer 
operating in the NATO-EU interface? Primarily, it means accepting less responsibility 
in overall mission accomplishment. It means patience in accepting less clarity 
concerning the path and time requirements for mission accomplishment, which is the 
very definition of a tolerance for ambiguity. This approach was strongly represented in 
each case concerning an operational unit commander. Each also spoke about the need 
for the EU to more effectively define its tasking and delineate responsibilities in a way 
that military officers are used to. Drafts of this thesis even included salient 
recommendations about better structuring EU tasking and providing more explicit detail 
to unit commanders. However, such an approach demonstrates a low tolerance for 
ambiguity. Asking what the EU can do to ease this burden on unit commanders is not 
the correct approach to the challenge. The EU should not be responsible for reducing 
  62 
perceived ambiguity in its civilian-focused capacity-building, nation-building, or 
security tasking. Instead, military officers must be more tolerant to such limitations 
within the EU environment. That, after all, is the definition of cross-cultural 
competence. 
 
Additionally, unit commanders expressed a notable leadership challenge when 
operating in the EU environment. Most modern militaries encourage a transformational 
leadership approach amongst its leaders. Transformational leadership involves the 
leader defining a guiding vision and empowering other team members to strive for that 
vision, rather than managing execution at every level. Accepting a tolerance for 
ambiguity also challenges the transformational approach to leadership. It is difficult to 
take initiative or define a clear vision with less structured tasking within EU operations. 
Unit commanders described it like having their hands tied together representing an 
inability to step out of their small role under the EU. It is a tall order to expect unit 
commanders to maintain a transformational approach within the EU environment. The 
opportunity for initiative is limited within EU missions. A future leadership study 
should look at the prevalence of transformational leadership at the strategic/operational 
interface of EU tasking. 
 
The third finding across cases represents the ‘region specific’ training discussed within 
other 3C and general cross-cultural literature. In the case of the NATO-EU interface, 
such ‘region specific’ training would consist of a better understanding of the EU’s 
structure and priorities. It is also found that this training would serve to further enhance 
development of the two KSAAs previously mentioned; willingness to engage and 
tolerance for ambiguity. A better understanding of the EU would temper military 
officers’ expectations of what the EU is capable of, and how it differs in this sense from 
NATO. Rather than the assumption noted throughout this study that the EU is “weak”, 
meaning military effectiveness, officers would benefit from understanding of in which 
areas the EU’s strengths lie. An officer with proficient knowledge of EU structures and 
comprehensive policy would be more willing to engage the appropriate EU institutions 
and consider EU foreign policy missions as a whole.  
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3C studies intentionally downplay the need for language ability in cultural integration. 
Language in this study, unlike other 3C research, is not a functional barrier to the 
NATO-EU interface as it might be for an American soldier interacting with a local 
mayor in Afghanistan. However, EU institutional fluency may substitute for language 
skill in this scenario. It is important to keep in mind that the general 3C construct has 
little to do with specialized cultural knowledge about customs and language. So, an 
improved understanding of how the EU operates should not be the focus of leadership 
development. The pivotal 3C factor is not simply learning how the EU works, but a 
more generalized approach to an unknown culture and situation. The willingness to 
engage and tolerance for ambiguity, among the other KSAAs, are 3C factors which can 
be applied to any social interaction. 
 
In response to the main research question, no new KSAAs were readily apparent as 
integral factors to navigating the NATO-EU interface. This is good news to the 3C 
training structures which are already in place in NATO and its member states. 
Therefore, the 3C construct is concluded to apply to NATO-EU cooperation for military 
officers. Two potential factors were investigated as possible additional KSAAs. During 
the In-Vivo Coding process, codes for “understanding the EU” and “maturity of the 
EU” appeared to point to additional requirements worth exploring. It was concluded that 
the idea of “understanding the EU” better applies to the idea of institutional fluency 
mentioned above. A common assumption is that if an individual can just speak the local 
language, then a cross-cultural situation would be easier to handle. If a military officer 
knew more about the EU, then he or she would better navigate the shift between 
cultures. However, there are more general interpersonal skills which far outweigh 
specific regional knowledge in developing competence in a particular culture. A strong 
willingness to engage is the first step which creates opportunities to enhance this 
“understanding the EU”. 
 
It was similarly concluded that the concept of the “maturity of the EU” points to a 
number of 3C factors already established. A lack of “maturity of the EU”, meaning less 
operational experience and established rules and procedures, was often cited across 
cases as a reason why NATO-EU interactions were complicated. NATO, it was 
  64 
assumed, simply ran more efficiently based on its historical background as a long-
standing military alliance. This thesis, however, was unable to derive a unique KSAA 
from this concept, but rather sees the idea of “maturity of the EU” as a conglomeration 
of factors. First, willingness to engage creates exposure to the EU and curiosity about its 
functionality. This approach will serve to limit the naïve assumptions about the EU’s 
strategy. Second, cognitive flexibility is important for adjusting to the EU as an 
organization by more effectively adapting to the decision-making style and decision-
making processes prevalent within the EU. Finally, ethnocultural empathy allows an 
officer to understand the differences between the organizations and consider the 
limitations within each system. These three factors effectively eliminate the source of 
the “maturity of the EU” complication rather than representing a KSAA unique to the 
NATO-EU interface. 
 
Finally, this thesis proposes a slight alteration to the 3C construct proposed by Ross 
(2010). Specifically, self-efficacy should be considered a gateway variable and 
tolerance for ambiguity rather part of the 3C construct. Self-efficacy is better 
represented as a pre-requisite to such pivotal 3C factors as willingness to engage and 
tolerance for ambiguity. Self-efficacy encompasses the confidence that the individual 
has the required abilities to succeed. This perspective was exemplified in Case 6 with 
the statement, 
“As long as I can take my own approach and my own way of doing things,  
then I am sure that wherever I am going or what I am doing then I have  
something to contribute. I think it is the most important thing. I can sort  
out the details of the organization as necessary, but I know that whoever  
I am working under I can do what I need to do to get the mission  
accomplished.”  
 
This skill is necessary in the face of ambiguity and allows for the patience necessary to 
pursue long-term objectives. Self-efficacy also encourages repeated attempts within a 
willingness to engage and serves to keep curiosity alive despite setbacks. Experience in 
the EU was summarized in Case 2 with, “This last three and half years in the EU, the 
soul was really drained. It is really hard to grasp. You can’t do it forever. It is just – you 
lose too many times and get too few wins.” Such a perspective speaks to the importance 
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of self-efficacy in enabling the other 3C factors to work towards better integration. 
Figure 5 represents the updated model of 3C concluded by this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 5. Proposed model of cross-cultural competence. Researcher’s variance on Ross (2010). 
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7. Discussion 
 
The aim of this research was to provide initial indications of whether the 3C construct 
has applicability to the NATO-EU interface and should be pursued further in order to 
better develop NATO officers for the leadership challenges associated with NATO-EU 
interaction. It is concluded that this stream of strategic culture research should be 
followed in order to further cultivate the interpersonal aspects and leadership challenges 
within NATO-EU cooperation. The hypothesized KSAAs from previous 3C research 
provided excellent correlation to the nature of challenges and scenarios faced within 
each of the seven cases covered by this study. The six KSAAs are concluded to be 
general enough to be adopted to this form of cross-cultural interaction and are certainly 
applicable to coping with the cultural differences in NATO and the EU.  
 
 7.1 Implications in strategic culture studies 
 
This thesis adds depth to strategic culture studies by analyzing the bearers and 
mediators of strategic culture. There is a fine difference between organizational culture 
and strategic culture at this level. This thesis provides a unique case study for exploring 
such a separation. It evaluates the socialization of “elites” who are responsible for 
interacting with, accumulating, and passing on their institutions’ strategic cultures. 
Rather than analyzing the strategic culture of security institutions themselves (NATO, 
the EU, nation states, etc.), this thesis examines strategic culture below the 
governmental level within the military institutions which provide critical input to how 
strategic culture takes the form that it does. This depth, below the governmental level in 
the “internal functionality”, is lacking in main stream strategic culture literature from 
any perspective (national to supranational, adversarial comparisons, and cooperative 
comparisons).  
 
On a broader scale, this study also uses strategic culture as a window into EU 
integration. Jeffrey Checkel (2005, p. 802) described the decades-long plight of scholars 
of EU integration “to theorize and document how state elites, in insulated settings, may 
adopt multiple identities and in some cases redefine their interests through processes of 
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social interaction within EU institutions.” This thesis, then, represents an attempt to 
show how the difficulties encountered by a group of people attempting to integrate 
within an EU institution can provide evidence of the process of integration from a 
constructivist perspective.  
 
 7.2 Recommendations for improving this research 
 
Some aspects of this thesis, however, should be improved upon in future research. This 
thesis is not based on inter-coder reliability or other more stringent methodologies but is 
intended to investigate the relationship between 3C and NATO-EU relations. A number 
of comments are worth addressing concerning the reliability and validity of the findings 
in this thesis. First, the researcher’s task is made more difficult with a language barrier. 
In this research, interviews were conducted in the language the study would be written 
in, English. For most cases, this was not a significant issue. Interview subjects with 
limited English skills, however, presented less monologue and very straight forward 
answers to the questions asked. The researcher was forced to draw out more 
comparisons by asking more direct questions and may have influenced the trend in 
answers received in these cases. It is difficult for an interview subject with weaker 
language skills to illustrate or elaborate on the leadership challenges encountered or 
interpersonal strategies employed when adjusting to the EU.  
 
Second, the “first impression of the EU” question, which was intended to substitute for 
the critical incident narrative found in other 3C studies, was not the best question to 
serve this purpose. This question was not suited to a majority of interview subjects 
whose first encounter with the EU or in an EU role was many years ago. These subjects’ 
later impressions proved more useful and detailed. The aim of a critical incident 
description is to identify the specific behavioral modifications undertaken, by 
employing various KSAAs, in order to adjust to the different culture. Future research 
should attempt to identify critical incidents as high-pressure or time-sensitive scenarios 
of NATO-EU cooperation or in an EU role. The “first impression” approach would 
work well in future studies if subjects are identified in their first 100 days on an EU 
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assignment. The impression of the cultural difference will still be fresh and will likely 
provide a better perspective than was found in this study. 
 
Third, asking first about NATO experience in the interviews did not produce the effect 
which was intended by the researcher. It was assumed that a discussion of the interview 
subject’s experiences in NATO would help to draw out better contrast to the EU 
cultural environment in later interview questions. This approach did not seem to stir any 
better or more detailed sentiments about adjustment to the EU cultural environment 
based on its difference from NATO. In some cases, such questions only seemed to 
confuse the discussion to topics not aligned with the aims of the study or caused mixed 
memories from interview subjects. With interview subjects more contemporarily 
involved with the transition to an EU assignment, the difference to NATO line of 
questioning should play a minimized role. 
 
Fourth, the researcher continuously adjusted how the research topic was introduced 
prior to beginning the interviews. If the study was introduced primarily as a leadership 
study, then subjects tended to steer their answers towards their own leadership style. A 
leadership style, although interesting to investigate, typically consists of leadership 
literature which the subject has been exposed to and after which he or she attempts to 
model his or her approach to leadership. A leadership style is a very difficult 
phenomenon to self-report in an interview setting. Additionally, a style or attitude is not 
necessarily made up of behavioral components. The focus of this study, with strategic 
culture as the theoretical framework, was focused on the patterns of behavior required 
for adjustment to the EU cultural environment. Therefore, interview subjects trying to 
convey their own leadership style detracted from the quality of the data. It was found 
that the best introduction of the study, prior to the interviews, was as a study of the 
military’s role in the EU. This tended to inspire more behavioral-focused answers and 
immediately got the subject thinking about challenges associated with his or her role in 
the EU. 
 
Finally, it is recommended that future studies employ ethnography as the methodology 
to focus on cross-cultural interactions across strategic cultures. Self-reporting of abstract 
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behavioral components is very unreliable. Certain situational based judgements or 
behaviors demand a more elaborate methodology than semi-structured interviews, 
which rely on self-reported insight (Ross 2010, p. 11). This deficiency has been noted in 
a number of previous 3C studies. Ethnography would better allow the researcher to 
assess the values, norms, and patterns of behavior associated with adjustment to the EU 
cultural environment. This would likely result in a more elaborate understanding of the 
interpersonal skills required in such a scenario. However, ethnography in military-
focused research can be very complicated. Operational commitments, security 
clearances, and researcher safety concerns all make military ethnography an especially 
difficult medium. It is worth noting that not a single DoD 3C study has conducted 
ethnography in the field, because the cross-cultural interactions worth exploring 
typically occur in a combat zone. The NATO-EU interface presents a more probable 
scenario where ethnography could be employed with the right amount of consideration 
and approval.  
 
 7.3 Opportunities for future study 
 
An additional area for future research involves more specific sub-cases to NATO-EU 
interaction. Data from this thesis indicates some variance depending on the role 
examined within each case. It was noted that tolerance for ambiguity, for example, was 
most applicable to unit commanders trying to translate strategic guidance into 
operational and tactical action. It is worth exploring whether the patterns of 3C demand 
a different focus on KSAAs in order to better adapt to different roles. Do the same 
findings hold true if the sub-case of only officers working on the EUMS are examined? 
Only operational officers? The intriguing sub-case for transatlantic cooperation, of 
course, would be the non-EU NATO officer. Are different sets of skills required for 
non-EU officer (e.g., American, Canadian, Norwegian, Albanian, etc.) to navigate the 
NATO-EU interface than for a German? This particular sub-case will take on an 
interesting dynamic with the UK soon falling into this category.  
 
The ideal future study on this topic, in the opinion of this thesis, would be an 
ethnographic study consisting of non-participant observation and interviews with senior 
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military officers in their first 100 days operating within the EU environment. A focus on 
a particular sub-case would only focus such a study, and likely provide even more 
actionable items for leadership preparation before such an assignment. 
 
It is also worth considering the impact changes in the EU would have on this thesis. 
Particular attention should be given to the trend of Europeanization or federalization of 
the EU. Changing internal conditions which result in deeper European integration, 
towards a United States of Europe, will have a measurable impact on the social actors 
responsible for executing the strategic framework of such an organization. Likewise, the 
creation of an autonomous European Army, recently called for by French President 
Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, would have a similar 
impact on the cooperation dynamics. Such a change would certainly alter the strategic 
culture of the organization and will also alter the leadership challenge faced by military 
officers in NATO-EU cooperation. It could be assumed that the importance for 
tolerance for ambiguity may be decreased with further federalization, as the EU would 
likely issue more concise and clear strategic visions if it were able to speak with a single 
unified voice. Regardless, this type of research will never be considered ‘complete’ as 
both NATO and the EU continue to develop and the leadership challenges facing those 
responsible for navigating the NATO-EU interface also varies.    
 
 
  
  71 
8. Conclusion 
 
This study represents a unique approach to the literature by investigating the 
applicability of cross-cultural competence modeling to strategic culture research. 
Strategic culture theory serves to characterize a nation or entity’s use of its military 
forces and is derived from more general cultural theories on national character. Culture 
theories have a uniquely personal aspect by examining how people come to decisions 
and regulate their own behaviors. The constructivist approach to strategic culture entails 
that the culture either shapes, or is shaped by, the behavior of social actors within the 
community. It is surprising, then, that this thesis represents a small corner of strategic 
culture literature which looks specifically at interpersonal interactions on the border of 
two organizational or strategic cultures. This thesis uses the NATO-EU interface as the 
merger of two potentially different strategic cultures and asks how an individual 
military leader best adjusts to both environments.  
 
This study is increasingly applicable to today’s security environment. Military leaders 
are consistently asked to be competent in a variety of cross-cultural situations 
throughout their careers. It is no longer enough in a post-modern military to simply rely 
on direction from above, but rather every officer must rise to the mantle of leadership 
by adapting to any unknown scenario – especially in a multinational environment. 
Leaders are asked to function between multiple organizations, structures, and 
requirements which requires a broader spectrum of cognitive ability than in the past. As 
an example of this, NATO-EU cooperation is becoming increasingly applicable and 
necessary for European security and defense. This requires more frequent crossing of 
the NATO-EU interface by a larger number of military officers in peace and crisis 
management scenarios. It is of utmost importance, then, that this study asks how 
military leaders navigate that interface on a personal level.  
 
This thesis was able to address the research question, and also shed light on some of the 
more far-reaching implications of this study. In considering the main research question, 
it is concluded that the NATO-EU interface represents a leadership challenge for 
military officers responsible for navigating between the two organizations. The 
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challenge can be characterized as entering a puzzling environment demanding of 
personal initiative and open-mindedness. The component factors of the 3C model, each 
of the hypothesized KSAAs, all apply to adaptation within this environment. It was 
found that a willingness to engage was particularly important across all cases, meaning 
that the EU must not be avoided as an inadequate or unknown labyrinth. A tolerance for 
ambiguity is particularly applicable to unit commanders dealing with operational 
assignments in the EU. Overall, this thesis has shown that the underlying assumptions 
of the 3C model can be applied to strategic culture theory. The hypothesized KSAAs in 
this study can serve as effective operationalization for the patterns of behavior of the 
socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior which 
comprise strategic culture. 
 
This is encouraging and supportive of the current leadership development paradigm in 
NATO and its member states which focuses on 3C in leadership training. Particular 
emphasis should be placed on willingness to engage and tolerance for ambiguity, and 
how these skills manifest, in preparation for an assignment to the EU. Based on the 
applicability of the 3C model to the NATO-EU interface, it does appear that the EU has 
a different strategic culture from NATO. Cross-cultural skills summarized nearly all of 
the challenges and frustrations which emerged in each case analyzed. Therefore, this 
thesis has shown that the same principles of 3C apply to cooperative strategic cultures 
between allies and partners. Such a finding is encouraging and likely also applies to 
other strategic or organizational culture partnerships such as EU-UN, the European 
Commission – European Parliament, and others. 
 
The ultimate take-away from this study is the applicability of 3C in all facets of 
leadership development. If anything, this thesis serves to underline the importance of 
cross-cultural abilities when it comes to handling new responsibilities across 
organizational or national divides. Through seven cases of NATO-EU interaction, with 
data from seven semi-structured elite interviews, the hypothesized KSAAs of the 3C 
model were deemed applicable to the leadership challenges faced. This is encouraging 
because it signifies that NATO’s leadership training on 3C, originally derived from 
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combat-zone interpersonal interactions, is equally applicable to assignments within 
various multinational organizations, as well. 
 
Future research on this topic should be focused on particular sub-cases of interest, and 
sub-cases must be prioritized based on the need for improved performance. Sub-cases of 
non-EU officers taking on a role in NATO requiring close coordination with the EU or 
of unit commanders operating under the EU flag for the first time are likely the most 
applicable to leadership development. Additionally, it is recommended that future 
studies employ an ethnographic approach to the research topic. A number of the 
situational judgements assessed in this study proved extremely difficult to assess in the 
self-reporting environment created by interviews alone. This deficit has been noted in 
other 3C studies, as well, and only highlights the importance of bringing the worlds of 
academia and practice closer together for mutual benefit.  
 
In the end, this thesis used the very academic framework of strategic culture to 
investigate the personal intricacies of leadership in a multinational environment. It 
boiled down a portion of the definition of strategic culture to specific behavioral 
adjustments necessary for integration across a divide in strategic cultures. It is easy to 
lose focus on the fact that under the elaborate academic theories and international 
strategic doctrines are people. People who interact, overcome challenges, and bring the 
commitments and visions of their organizations to life. Leadership development is a 
life-long journey and the NATO-EU interface serves as a unique challenge along that 
path for military officers. Any research which can help frame that responsibility in a 
tangible, actionable manner, serves to improve collaboration between the two 
organizations into the future. 
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Appendix A: Interview Matrix 
 
Case 
number 
Experience 
operating in 
NATO and EU? 
Experience Date Location Length  (in words) 
01 NATO only EU cooperation 
Senior Officer,  
Special Assistant to SACEUR,  
NATO Int’l Military Staff 
18Feb19 Skype 4,879 
02 Both 
Flag Officer,  
Chief of Staff NATO Allied 
Maritime Command, 
Deputy Director General of EUMS 
19Feb19 Skype 9,210 
03 NATO only EU cooperation 
Flag Officer,  
Commander Allied Land Command, 
Commander of U.S. Army Europe 
21Feb19 Skype and Tartu 3,440 
04 Both 
Senior Officer,  
Chief of Staff SNMG2,  
Training liaison Operation Atalanta 
21Feb19 Tartu 3,056 
05 Both 
Senior Officer, 
Commanding Officer in SNMG2,  
Operation Sophia flagship 
commanding officer 
26Feb19 Tartu 4,698 
06 Both 
Senior Officer,  
Commanding Officer in SNMG2, 
Operation Atalanta Operational 
Headquarters  
01Mar19 Tartu 6,701 
07 Both 
Flag Officer,  
NATO ASG for Policy & Planning, 
EUMS Chief of Staff 
07Mar19 Tartu 5,658 
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Appendix B: Interview Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
 “NATO and the EU: Operationalizing strategic culture in an increasingly integrated relationship” 
(Working title) 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
You are being invited to participate in the research project “NATO and the EU: 
Operationalizing strategic culture in an increasingly integrated relationship”, carried out 
by Sean Fitzmaurice, a master’s degree candidate of the University of Tartu’s Johan 
Skytte Institute of Political Studies. You have been selected to participate in this study 
because you have experience operating in both the NATO and EU decision-making 
environments. The information provided in this form is to help you decide whether you 
would like to take part in this study. If you have any questions, please contact the 
researcher at seanfitzmaurice@gmail.com or by phone +372 5366 1940. More 
information about the researcher can be found at the end of this form. 
 
Aims and implications of the research: This research will help understand the 
leadership challenges associated with the increasingly integrated role senior military 
officers play within both NATO and the EU - often simultaneously. The overall project 
will focus on the effects that an emerging EU strategic culture has on operational 
decision-makers. The purpose is two-fold: first, to better understand the leadership 
challenges facing top military leadership in an environment that blends two different 
organizations in terms of strategy, policy, limitations, and goals; and second, to provide 
evidence as to whether the EU in fact does have a distinct strategic culture separate from 
NATO’s.  
 
Procedures of the research: Should you agree to participate, it will take approximately 
45 minutes of your time to be interviewed. During the interview you will be asked to 
answer questions about your personal experience in both NATO and EU operations. 
Questions will focus strictly on your personal leadership experience – what are the 
behavioral differences between the two organizations? Questions about general 
NATO/EU policy, politics, and strategy will not be discussed. The interview will be 
audio-recorded to ensure that the researcher has an accurate record of the discussion. 
Audio recording will be destroyed after the interview has been transcribed. The researcher 
will ensure protection of personal data and secure processing and storage of the gathered 
empirical material as outlined below. 
 
Possible risks and benefits for participants: This research involves minimal risk to 
participants. Measures will be taken to protect the confidentiality and privacy of research 
participants. Interviewees remain anonymous and their responses will not be linked to 
their identity. Participants are free to withdraw from the project at any time and may skip 
a question if they feel uncomfortable giving an answer. You are not expected to directly 
benefit from participating in this research study except for insight you might gain through 
answering the interview questions. If you are interested in obtaining a summary of 
research findings, please let the researcher know. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality of personal data: Reasonable steps will be taken to 
protect your privacy and the confidentiality of your study data. Assigning numbers to 
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each interviewee will anonymize the data. The subjects’ identifiers (name, address, email 
address, telephone number etc.) will not be maintained in association with the research 
data, and will only be known to the principal investigator. The only person who will have 
access to the audio file and the transcription of the interview is the principal investigator 
from the University of Tartu, and any other person or agency required by law. 
Confidentiality will also be strictly observed in presentation of findings: the interviewees 
will remain anonymous and their answers will not directly be tied to their identifiers, thus 
rendering them unidentifiable. Audio recordings and transcripts will be destroyed after 
the completion of the analysis. The information from this study may be published and 
publicly presented, but your identity will be kept confidential. You will remain 
anonymous and will not be identifiable from the data. 
 
Rights of research participants: You can choose not to participate in this study or 
withdraw your participation at any time during or after the research begins. Refusing to 
be in this study or deciding to discontinue participation will not affect your relationship 
with the investigator or the University of Tartu. Should you encounter problems as a direct 
result of being in this study, please contact the principal investigator listed at the end of 
this consent form. 
 
Informed consent: You are freely deciding whether to participate in this research study. 
To agree to the interview means that you have read and understood this consent form, 
you have had your questions answered, and you have decided to be part of the research 
study. 
 
If you have any questions before or during the study, you should talk to one of the 
investigators listed below. You will be given a copy of this document for your own 
records. 
 
About the researcher: Sean Fitzmaurice is an active duty Lieutenant in the United States 
Navy. He is an experienced nuclear submarine officer and was selected for an Olmsted 
Scholarship in 2016. As an Olmsted Scholar, the language of instruction of his degree, in 
European Studies from the University of Tartu, is Estonian. His academic interests lie in 
leadership development, cross-cultural competence, and emotional intelligence. LT 
Fitzmaurice’s ultimate goal is to one day serve as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR).  
 
 
Study personnel: 
 
Principal Investigator     seanfitzmaurice@gmail.com  
Sean Fitzmaurice +372  5xxx  xxxx 
   
Supervisors 
Epp Adler epp.adler@ut.ee   
Eoin Micheál McNamara eoin.mcnamara@ut.ee 
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Appendix C: Interview Guide 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
“NATO and the EU: Operationalizing strategic culture in an increasingly integrated relationship” 
(Working title) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
At the beginning of each interview, the researcher introduces himself and briefly describes 
the project background and goals. The researcher distributes the informed consent statement 
and project description. Also during this introduction, the following critical information is 
conveyed to participants:  
1. Participants are informed about the expected duration, general nature of the 
interview, and that the researcher is responsible for controlling the flow of interview 
topics. Participants are guided throughout the interview to provide their own 
personal narrative accounts as answers to the interview questions rather than brief 
answers from doctrine or regulations. 
2. Participants are reminded that participation is entirely voluntary, and that they can 
refuse to be interviewed, decline to answer specific questions, or stop the interview 
at any time at their discretion with no negative repercussions.  
3. Participants are told that the project and in particular, the interviews, are 
conducted at an unclassified level, and will ultimately rely on the participant to not 
reveal sensitive or classified information. Participants are advised to err on the side 
of safety when they are uncertain as to the sensitivity or classification of 
information.  
4. Participants are explicitly asked to not reveal names or any other identifying 
information about any other fellow military members during the course of the 
interviews. (If such names are revealed they will be removed and identifiers inserted 
during data preparation.)  
5. Participants are asked for permission to audio record the interview. The 
researcher will explicitly state that the participant can decline this request with no 
negative repercussions whatsoever, and that they may have the recording stopped at 
any time during the course of the interview. 
6. Participants are then asked if they have any questions prior to beginning the 
interview. 
 
  
  84 
II. BACKGROUND/EXPERIENCE 
How would you summarize your experience operating with NATO and the EU?  
How much exposure have you had to each? 
What have you done with each organization? 
Have you been responsible for decision-making within each organization? 
 
Do you remember your first impression of working with the EU?  
 What struck you about the organization?  
Has that changed over time? 
 
 
Which do you prefer to work with, NATO or the EU?  
 Do you feel comfortable in both environments? 
 Which is more efficient? 
 Is one more dedicated to their craft than another? 
 
Is there a such thing as “an EU military officer”? 
 Who are they? 
Are there stereotypes of each organization? Not just for military staff, but 
civilian staff, and the organization as a whole? 
 
Both organizations have civil-military relations. In the EU it is the Councils, and 
frankly the rest of the EU structure. NATO has the political committee of defense 
ministers and standard civilian policy employees, etc.  
Is the civilian and military relationship different in the EU and NATO?  
Who is “working” for who? 
 
How would you describe the EU’s approach to using military force? (In your opinion!) 
 NATO’s approach? 
 Looking to find a way to get involved, neutral, or “last ditch effort”? 
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II. ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES 
Is your job different when you are working on a project or mission with the EU, 
compared to NATO?  
 Do you focus your time differently?  
 How so? 
 
Is the “product” that you develop for the EU different than you would produce for 
NATO?  
Does the EU, in general, look for different deliverables? 
How would you compare the attention to detail, in general, between the two 
organizations? 
 
Are there behaviors or ideas which work well in NATO but not in the EU? 
 Can you provide examples? 
 
What is the most frustrating thing about working with/for the EU? 
 
In which organization is long-term vision more valued? 
In which organization is experience more valued? 
 How does one prove experience in each? Years in service, projects, reputation… 
 In which organization is diplomacy and cooperation more valued? 
 
In a conflict of interest or disagreement, does the EU bend to NATO or the other way 
around? 
 Which side is more understanding of the other? 
  Does NATO understand the EU better than the EU understands NATO? 
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III. REQUIRED TRAITS 
 
Even Admirals have mentors… 
I would like you think of an officer who has significant influence when dealing with 
both EU and NATO. 
What is it that you feel he or she does well? 
How does one achieve such influence? 
 
As a young NATO officer, if I were to have my first assignment within the EU 
structure, what advice would you give me? 
 
Is it important to approach EU and NATO tasks differently? 
 What do I have to keep in mind for each? 
 
In negotiations or planning, is it better to be quick and direct with the EU or is a 
diplomatic approach required? 
 Can I do well in charge of a unit, a ship or battalion, within an EUNAVFOR or 
EUFOR without really understanding anything about the EU? 
How much knowledge of the EU is needed in order to do well? 
 
 
Much has been written and debated about the EU developing strategic autonomy from 
NATO, and therefore developing its own strategic culture – or the way in which the EU 
views the use of its armed forces… 
Do you feel the culture in the EU, today, is different from the culture in NATO? 
 Or is there so much spill-over between the two staffs that their cultures - the way 
of going about their business - are relatively the same? 
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Appendix D: Code Book 
 
Category Code Definition Example 
Self-efficacy Self-efficacy belief in one’s own abilities to 
attain certain goals. Other 
indications of confidence 
“If you like challenges, then 
you will enjoy the EU. If you 
like challenges and your own 
approach is to see things and 
learn different things and 
change things for the better, 
then you will do well in the 
EU.” (Case 6) 
Commitment the drive to see a task to 
completion despite setbacks and 
challenges 
“…developing a momentum 
and direction to keep enough 
people clinging to, and 
believing in long enough, to 
achieve the effect you believe 
should be achieved.” (Case 
2) 
Perseverance the persistent pursuit of goals 
and objectives and ability to 
keep focused on them 
“This last three and half 
years in the EU, the soul was 
really drained. It is really 
hard to grasp. You can’t do 
it forever. It is just – you lose 
too many times and get too 
few wins. When the wins 
come along, they are great 
news.” (Case 2) 
Ethnocultural 
Empathy 
Ethnocultural 
empathy 
to detect, consider, and analyze 
others’ views as well as their 
self-perception, behavior, and 
perception of others 
“Acknowledging and 
respecting their role to try to 
do everything to achieve 
good results together. At 
least that meant 
coordination, at least 
transparency, knowing what 
each other was doing and 
taking it into account for our 
own work.” (Case 7) 
Consideration for 
the “other” 
acknowledgement of the other 
culture (the EU) as a different 
cultural entity. Allowing for the 
deliberate consideration of the 
sensitivity and tradition of the 
“other side”.  
“Even though I thought I 
was a pretty sophisticated 
American who understood 
Europe, and based on 
everything I just told you, I 
was a little slow to realize 
some other things that I 
could have and should have 
been doing. And all my 
European friends, when I 
was talking to them, half of 
their brain is thinking EU 
and half of their brain is 
thinking NATO.” (Case 3) 
Perspective-taking the ability to see events as 
another person sees them. 
Signified by overcoming 
stereotypes or prejudices 
 
“The EUMS does not have 
the staff in it to do peer to 
peer competition planning, 
and none of their 
operational staffs can do it 
either. I’ve been to a number 
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* the quote in the next column is 
an excellent example of an 
“Opposite” code turned to 
KSAA. The segment was 
initially coded “Opposite” for 
the researcher to further assess 
what KSAA would alleviate this 
frustration. It was not concluded 
that the EU is “weak” or “too 
small to be effective”, which 
was the tone of this portion of 
the data. Rather, the interview 
subject required “perspective-
taking” to realize that the EU 
has certain limitations and 
priorities, which means its goals 
and strategy are different from 
what he is used to with NATO. 
The EU is not focused on peer 
to peer competition, and that 
perspective must be better 
understood. 
of them, and they are tiny 
little things. A 100-man staff. 
There’s not much you can do 
with that.” (Case 1) † 
Willingness to 
Engage 
Willingness to 
engage 
the ability to make sense of 
unfamiliar social situations in 
dissimilar cultures by involving 
oneself in the process 
“EUMS was all about 
getting out and about in 
different people’s offices. In 
different organization’s 
offices’. With different 
mentalities. You could be 
talking to an EU 
Humanitarian Aid guy one 
day. A financier the next day. 
Someone who does bank 
accounts the next. You name 
it. There were all kinds of 
activity because one of the 
problems that we had for 
CSDP to work, was that it 
demanded consensus.” 
(Case 2) 
Open-minded 
interest 
an attempt to eliminate 
assumptions while embracing a 
curiosity about what 
opportunities may exist in the 
other culture. A generally 
positive outlook by viewing 
cultural difference as an 
intriguing challenge.  
“I am never satisfied with 
something that is given. I 
understand it is given. But 
now, through my critical 
thinking, I need to challenge 
that somehow to determine if 
it is the right thing or if it can 
be improved.” (Case 6) 
Engagement direct involvement in the 
different processes within the 
other culture. Rather than 
holding back, this skill involves 
actual interaction with the 
unknown 
“We’ve had a devil job to get 
our best people into NATO, 
let alone the EU. Because it 
is much more important to 
fight through the corridors 
of power in Whitehall than it 
is to go deal with jolly 
foreigners in foreign parts. It 
couldn’t be more untrue if 
you tried, but that’s an 
attitude of minds which is 
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not yet dead. And it is one of 
those things that will be a 
very hard lesson.” (Case 2) 
Cognitive 
Flexibility 
Cognitive 
flexibility 
the ability to comprehend the 
facts to understand different 
roles and approaches to 
different situations. 
Maintaining an increasingly 
broad arsenal of mental models 
to draw from. 
“You come from a pedigree 
which tells you that to 
achieve X, you have to do A 
and B. And it always works. 
Then, suddenly, you come 
along and someone is 
achieving X by doing P and 
Q. How can that be 
possible? My boss has 
already taught me that to get 
X, you do A and B. It’s the 
way to do it. And we realize 
that we are not profound to 
all knowledge. We are not as 
great as we might think we 
are, the trouble is not all of 
us are there.” (Case 2) 
Adaptability willing and able to adjust to 
changing demands and 
objectives; not stuck to one 
single path or train of thought, 
but rather applies different 
mental models for each 
situation 
“I think most guys quickly, 
professional officers, men 
and women, quickly figure 
out OK this is not a bad 
thing. It is just the way it is. 
When you go to Afghanistan 
you have to deal with people 
who are Dari or Pashtun. 
Wherever you go. That’s 
why all of our services claim 
and strive to produce 
leaders that are adaptive. 
And coming to Europe is no 
different. You have to be 
adaptive to understand it.” 
(Case 3) 
Self-
monitoring 
Self-monitoring the ability to modify behavior to 
comply with or demonstrate 
respect for others’ values or 
customs. Picks up on necessary 
social cues and adjusts 
message/tasking as necessary 
“[The EU] does not always 
appreciate military logic or 
operational risks and 
imperatives. The fact that we 
are screaming bloody 
murder and saying we are 
all going to die doesn’t 
necessarily wash up with 
many people. You have to ply 
this in a different way.” 
(Case 2) 
Tact and respect specific adjustment to social 
cues in a manner congruent with 
cultural expectations; 
communicating as equals which  
includes building trust across 
cultural boundaries 
“…and ensure that we had 
cordial, open discussions. I 
stressed much importance to 
stressing trustful, collegiate 
relationships with our 
counterparts in other 
divisions and in the EU. 
Acknowledging and 
respecting their role to try to 
do everything to achieve 
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good results together.” 
(Case 7) 
Amiability having a friendly or pleasant 
manner in social interactions in 
order to alleviate tension or not 
appear confrontational 
“We are used to being very 
operational. To be concrete, 
to see results, and to aim for 
more results. While the EU 
you must be more 
diplomatic. More 
passionate, really. More 
friendly.” (Case 5) 
Tolerance for 
Ambiguity 
Tolerance for 
ambiguity 
open-mindedness in the face of 
confusion or uncertainty rather 
than a need for immediate 
closure or resolution 
“But when we decide 
something, we must follow it. 
That is the problem. In the 
European Union, when you 
have different interests 
maybe we begin with one 
task but after comes 
deviation. This is a problem. 
I prefer working under 
NATO because it was crystal 
clear, the task.” (Case 4) † 
Structure desire for cognitive closure and 
predictable outcomes; actually 
represents the inverse of  
tolerance for ambiguity. Most 
often associated with a low 
tolerance for ambiguity 
“To deal with military and 
civilian at the same time 
when I sort out who is giving 
me direction and when. That 
is uncomfortable as an 
officer working for the EU.” 
(Case 5) † 
Patience the ability to withstand long-
term results in the face of 
uncertainty or confusion, 
especially when it is assumed 
such results could be achieved 
faster in one’s home culture 
(NATO).  
“But to achieve that effect 
took us seven months. And 
that is one of the biggest 
problems with the EU is that 
it takes much, much, much, 
longer to achieve an effect 
and to initiate an effect than 
it does with NATO. But the 
chances are that you will 
have more of an enduring 
effect because you have all 
of these levers of power 
engaged in the end of it.” 
(Case 2) 
Opposite Opposite This code was used to denote a 
challenge where the wording of 
the data was negative in context. 
These coded segments required 
the interpretive analysis of the 
researcher to further assess how 
to alleviate the challenge, and 
then to determine which KSAA 
code applied to the scenario. 
 
* For another example, see the 
“perspective-taking” code. And 
other examples marked with the 
† symbol 
“I was astounded, I was very 
naïve. I assumed because 
almost every country in 
which we were operating 
from Estonia down to 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, 
all of them, and of course 
Germany, then we should be 
able to move very quickly. 
They were all NATO. All 
EU.” (Case 3)  
Later credited to “open-
minded interest” code 
because of operating on 
  91 
unfounded assumptions led 
to the frustration/difficulty. 
In-Vivo 
coding 
“understand the 
EU” 
This In-Vivo code was a 
common theme across cases and 
was investigated as a potential 
unique KSAA. Segments of 
data received this code when 
subjects spoke about the 
complexity of the EU system 
and trying to understand where 
and how the military was 
utilized by the EU.  
 
After several iterations, these 
segments took on the code 
“willingness to engage” due to 
its congruence with developing 
institutional fluency.  
“The EU is very difficult to 
understand. As an 
organization NATO is quite 
clear. We are the military 
component of a very clear 
organization. The EU is 
quite more complex to 
understand. I had a lot of 
difficulties.” (Case 5) 
 
“That is something which a 
military officer needs to 
recognize and understand is 
that the focus in the EU when 
it comes to supporting 
partners and other nations, 
primarily in Africa but also 
the Balkans, is primarily a 
civilian or political 
responsibility. The military 
element is rather a 
supporting element, 
relatively small, but very 
important. Just part of a 
bigger comprehensive 
civilian-civilian-civilian-
military approach.” (Case 
7) 
 “maturity of the 
EU” 
This In-Vivo code was a 
common theme across cases and 
was investigated as a potential 
unique KSAA. Segments of 
data received this code when 
subjects spoke about NATO as 
the more established military 
organization. The assumption 
was that the EU just needed 
more experience employing its 
military component in order to 
“catch up” to NATO.  
 
After several iterations, these 
various segments took on the 
codes of: 
 
“willingness to engage” for its 
exposure to the EU and 
curiosity about its functionality. 
 
“cognitive flexibility” for 
adjusting to the EU as an 
organization by more 
effectively adapting to the 
decision-making style and 
“So, even though we operate 
both organizations by the 
same people, the structures, 
coordination, and 
relationships are all at 
different stages. Let’s say 
that. They are in different 
stages. Until you get to 
maturity like NATO, it will 
probably face more 
challenges than NATO 
operations.” (Case 6) 
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decision-making processes 
prevalent within the EU.  
 
“ethnocultural empathy” for 
allowing an individual to 
understand the differences 
between the organizations and 
consider the limitations within 
each system. 
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NAVIGEERIMINE NATO ja EUROOPA LIIDU TELJEL: STRATEEGILISE 
KULTUURI RAKENDAMINE ÜHA ENAM LÄBIPÕIMUNUD SUHETES.  
Sean Joseph Fitzmaurice  
 
Resümee 
 
Magistritöö käsitleb NATO ja EL telge, organisatsioonide omavahelist koostööd ja selle 
juhtimist. Töös analüüsiti poolstruktureeritud intervjuusid kõrgemate sõjaväelastega, kes 
on teinud koostööd nende kahe julgeolekuasutuse vahel, ning püüti leida väärtuslikke 
õppetunde ja parimaid praktikaid, mida noorematele NATO ohvitseridele edasi anda, kes 
esimest korda EL ülesannetega kokku puutuvad. Uuringu lähtekohaks oli alljärgnev 
uurimusküsimus: „Millised oskused on vajalikud erineva strateegilise kultuuriga 
kohanemiseks?” Uurimistööst järeldus, et cross-cultural competence (3C), ehk 
kultuuridevahelise pädevuse tegurid on sobilikud üksikute sõjaliste juhtide jaoks, et 
kohaneda EL julgeolekukeskkonnaga. 
 
NATO ja EL telje erinevusi on uuritud paljude raamistike kaudu. Strateegilise kultuuri 
kontseptsioon on kõige sobivam, kuna seda kasutatakse selleks, et kirjeldada strateegiliste 
otsuste tegemist ja käitumist, mida võib organisatsioonis toimivatelt inimestelt eeldada. 
Käesolevas töös on strateegiline kultuur määratletud sotsiaalselt edastatud, identiteedist 
tuletatud normide, ideede ja käitumismustrite kogumina, mis toimivad 
julgeolekuühenduste töötajate ja sotsiaalsete rühmade vahel ning aitavad saavutada 
julgeoleku ja kaitse eesmärke. Uude strateegilisse kultuuri sisenemine toob kaasa 
juhtimisprobleeme neile, kelle ülesandeks on tegutseda kahes erinevas organisatsioonis, 
sageli samaaegselt. Akadeemiline kirjandus keskendub pigem julgeolekuasutuste 
strateegilise kultuuri määratlemisele. Valdavalt uurivad küsimused, kuidas arendatakse 
strateegilist kultuuri või kust tuletatakse strateegiline kultuur. Selle asemel vaadeldakse 
käesolevas töös strateegilise kultuuri rolli organisatsioonides tegutsevate sotsiaalsete 
osalejate otsuste ja hoiakute kujundamisel. 
 
Töö kujutab endast ainulaadset lähenemist kirjandusele, sest uurib kultuuridevahelise 
pädevuse modelleerimise rakendatavust strateegilistele kultuuriuuringutele. Strateegilise 
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kultuuri teooria iseloomustab riigi või üksuse sõjaliste jõudude kasutamist ja on saadud 
üldisematest kultuuriteooriatest. Kultuuriteooriatel on ainulaadne isiklik aspekt, uurides, 
kuidas inimesed otsustavad ja reguleerivad oma käitumist. Strateegilisele kultuurile 
suunatud konstruktivistlik lähenemine eeldab, et kultuur on kujundatud või kujundab 
ühiskonna sotsiaalsete osalejate käitumist. Seega on uudne selle magistritöö vaatenurk: 
töö vaatleb väikest osa strateegilise kultuuri kirjandusest, mis käsitleb konkreetselt 
interpersonaalset suhtlemist kahe organisatsioonilise või strateegilise kultuuri piiril. See 
töö kasutab NATO-EL suhet kahe potentsiaalselt erineva strateegilise kultuuri 
ühendamisel ja küsib, kuidas sõjaväeliider saaks kõige paremini kohaneda mõlema 
keskkonnaga? 
 
Kohanemine kultuurilise erinevusega ei ole sõjaväes uus mõiste. Uue kultuuriga 
kohanemise uurimiseks on selle töö kõige sobivam raamistik cross-cultural competence 
(3C). 3C on töös määratletud kui teadmiste, oskuste ja motivatsiooni kogum, mis 
võimaldab inimestel kultuuridevahelises keskkonnas tõhusalt kohaneda (the set of 
knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enable individuals to adapt effectively in 
cross-cultural environments). 3C mudel hõlmab teadmisi, oskusi, hoiakuid ja võimeid 
(knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities ehk KSAA), mis paremini valmistavad kedagi 
ette kultuuridevaheliseks kommunikatsiooniks. NATO kasutab kõrgemate juhtide 
koolitusprogrammides 3C mudelit ja soovib seda kasutada ka rahvusvahelises koostöös. 
 
Selles uuringus lähtuti nii induktiivsest kui ka deduktiivsest meetodist. Deduktiivne 
lähenemine kaeti sõjalise spetsiifilise 3C kirjanduse ülevaate abil. Varasematest 
uuringutest loodi kuuest KSAA-st nimekiri, mida testiti intervjuude vältel. Need tegurid 
olid enesetõhusus (self-efficacy), etnokultuuriline empaatia (ethnocultural empathy), 
valmisolek osaleda (willingness to engage), kognitiivne paindlikkus (cognitive 
flexibility), enesekontroll (self-monitoring) ja toimetulek ettemääramatusega (tolerance 
for ambiguity). Eeldati, et need kuus 3C tegurit aitavad mõista või lahendada raskusi ja 
väljakutseid, millega seisavad silmitsi EL organisatsioonikultuuriga kohanevad 
sõjaväeliidrid. Ning seda eeldusel, et EL on tegelikult eraldi strateegiline kultuur. Uuringu 
induktiivne osa koosnes intervjuuandmete täiendavast analüüsist, millest sooviti leida 
  95 
võimalikke täiendusi või alternatiivseid KSAA-sid, mis võiksid paremini sobida NATO-
EL teljel. 
 
Intervjuud toimusid seitsme sõjaväeliidriga, kellel kõigil oli nii NATO kui ka EL 
kogemus. Need olid EL sõjalise staabi endine asepeadirektor, NATO abipeasekretär, ja 
ohvitserid, kes juhtisid laevu EUNAVFOR MED Sophias ja operatsioon Atalantas ning 
teised. Iga intervjueeritav kirjeldas oma kogemusi oma rolliga kohanemisel ELis, andes 
märku pettumustest, kummalistest kogemustest ja väljakutsetest. 
 
Seejärel viis uurija läbi tõlgendusanalüüsi, et paremini mõista iga liidri ees seisvaid 
väljakutseid. Igal üksikjuhul analüüsiti iga andmekogumit enne omaette ning tehti 
seejärel juhtumite ristanalüüs. Uurija hindas iga intervjueeritava kogemuste 
käitumuslikke aspekte. Kuigi väljendatud arvamust peeti iga intervjuu jaoks 
asjakohaseks, siis juhul kui esitatud küsimus lõi peegeldumise võimaluse, keskendus 
uurija tõlgenduslik analüüs pigem kogemuse käitumuslikule kirjeldusele. Narratiiv andis 
parema võimaluse hinnata, kuidas iga teema oma sotsiaalsete mõjutuste tõttu kohandas. 
Iga juhtumi kirjelduse kaudu selgus, kuidas iga kuue hüpoteesis välja pakutud KSAA-l 
oli oluline roll EL keskkonnaga kohanemisel. Juhtumi kirjeldused on olulised, et saada 
aru kuidas igal erineval juhul väljakutsed tekkisid, ning kuidas uurija määras neile õige 
kategooria. 
 
Juhtumite ristanalüüsi peamised järeldused hõlmasid konkreetselt valmisolekut osaleda 
ja tolerantsust ebamäärasusega. Leiti, et valmisolek osaleda oli eriti oluline kõikidel 
juhtudel, mis tähendab, et EL struktuure ja koostööformaate ei tohi vältida nende 
ebapiisava tundmise tõttu. See konkreetne tegur oli iga juhtumi puhul kergesti levinud ja 
tähistas kõige järjepidevamat suundumust kõigil juhtudel. Andmetest võib järeldada, et 
sõjaväeohvitser ei tohi läheneda EL koostööformaatidele selle mõtteviisiga, et ta saab 
jätkata seal samamoodi nagu teistel sõjalistel töökohtadel, mida ta on varem täitnud. Selle 
asemel on vaja valmisolekut osaleda avatult ja selleks, et parandada uue rolli mõistmist 
ja sellega kohanemist, tunnistada, et EL esitab (aõjalise ülesande täitmiseks) varasemast 
erineva väljakutse. Ohvitser NATO-EL teljel ei tohi eeldada, et kehtivad samad 
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strateegiad, käitumisnormid ja -praktikad, ning nad peavad innukamalt otsima võimalust 
paremini mõista EL kultuuri. 
 
Lisaks leiti, et tolerantsus ebamäärasusega on eriti rakendatav liidritele, kes tegelevad 
operatiivülesannetega EL tasandil. Kõrged sõjaväelased, eriti mereväekaptenid, on oma 
ülesannete täitmisel harjunud teatava autonoomiaga. Nad on harjunud olema missioonile 
jõudmisel enesekindlad. Missioonide liigid, mida EL sõjalises domeenis, tavaliselt seire- 
ja julgeolekuülesannetega seoses täidab, tunduvad arusaamatud üksuse juhatajale, kes on 
harjunud juhtima kogu operatsiooni. Seetõttu peab NATO-EL teljel navigeerimiseks 
olema üksuse ülem valmis orienteeruma ebaselges keskkonnas, olles samal ajal kannatlik, 
selleks, et viia läbi EL nõutav ülesanne. Väljakutseid ei saa lahendada EL poolt üksuste 
liidrite koormuse leevendamise abil selles vallas. Teisisõnu, EL ei peaks olema vastutav 
tajutava ebamäärasuse vähendamise eest, sest nende ülesanded hõlmavadki teist tüüpi 
ülesandeid: tsiviilse suutlikkuse suurendamist, riigi ülesehitamist või 
julgeolekuülesannete täitmist. Selle asemel peavad sõjaväeohvitserid õppima sellises EL 
keskkonnas tolerantsemalt toime tulema. Lõppude lõpuks on see kultuuridevahelise 
pädevuse määratlus. 
 
Seejärel jõuti järeldusele, et NATO-EL telg kujutab endast kõrgematele sõjaväelastele 
kultuuride ja strateegilise kultuuride vahelise navigeerimise väljakutset. Seda väljakutset 
võib iseloomustada nii, et juht siseneb ebamäärasesse keskkonda, mis nõuab isiklikku 
initsiatiivi ja avatust. See magistritöö näitas, et 3C mudeli aluseks olevaid eeldusi saab 
üldjoontes rakendada strateegilise kultuuri teoorias. Selle uuringu hüpoteesidena 
püstitatud KSAA-d võivad olla efektiivne rakendusviis strateegilist kultuuri hõlmavate, 
sotsiaalselt edastatud, identiteedist tuletatud normide, ideede ja käitumismustrite jaoks. 
 
See järeldus toetab praegust juhtimise arendamise õppekava NATOs ja selle 
liikmesriikides, mis keskendub 3C-le juhtimiskoolituses. Erilist rõhku tuleks panna 
valmisolekule osaleda ja tolerantsusele ebamäärasusega ning sellele, kuidas neid oskusi 
rakendada sõjavaelaste ettevalmistamisel koostööks EL organisatsioonis. Tuginedes 3C 
mudeli rakendatavusele NATO-EL teljel, saab öelda, et EL omab NATOst erinevat 
strateegilist kultuuri. Peaaegu kõik analüüsitud väljakutsed ja pettumused on taandatavad 
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kultuuridevahelise kommunikatsiooni oskustele. Seetõttu on see magistritöö näidanud, et 
samad 3C põhimõtted kehtivad strateegiate suhtes, mis puudutavad liitlaste ja partnerite 
vahelist koostööd. Selline järeldus on julgustav ja tõenäoliselt kehtib ka teiste 
strateegiliste või organisatsiooniliste kultuuride partnerluste kohta, nagu EL-ÜRO, 
Euroopa Komisjon-Euroopa Parlament, vms. 
 
Selle uuringu kokkuvõtlik õppetund on: 3C on rakendatav juhtimise arendamise kõigis 
aspektides. Töö eesmärk oli rõhutada kultuuridevahelise kommunikatsiooni oskuste 
tähtsust uute ülesannete käsitlemisel neis organisatsioonides riikidevahelistes 
töölõikudes. Töös testiti lähtehüpoteesi, milleks oli: kas 3C mudeli KSAA-sid saaks 
kohaldada juhtimisprobleemidele kahe organisatsiooni vahel ning testisime seda seitsme 
poolstruktureeritud eliitintervjuu põhjal NATO-EL teljel. See tähendab, et 3C NATO 
juhtkoolitus, mis põhineb algselt võitlusvööndi inimsuhete interaktsioonidel, on võrdselt 
kohaldatav ka rahvusvahelistes organisatsioonides. 
 
Teema tulevased uuringud peaksid keskenduma konkreetsetele uurimisprobleemidele ja 
alamjuhtumitele, lähtudes vajadust saavutada nende organisatsioonide vahel paremat 
tulemuslikkust. Kõige olulisemad osalised organisatsioonidevahelises koostöös on need 
NATO ohvitserid, kes teevad tihedat koostööd ELiga, või esimest korda EL lipu all 
tegutsevad üksuse juhid. Lisaks on soovitatav, et tulevased uuringud kasutaksid 
uurimisteemale etnograafilist lähenemist. Mitmeid käesolevas uuringus analüüsitud 
otsuseid, mis intervjuude eneseanalüüsist välja tulid, oli väga raske hinnata. Seda 
puudujääki on täheldatud ka teistes 3C uuringutes, ning toonitab ainult seda, kui oluline 
on akadeemiliste ringkondade ja praktika lähendamine vastastikuse kasu 
maksimeerimiseks. 
 
Lõppkokkuvõttes kasutas magistritöö strateegilise kultuuri akadeemilist raamistikku, et 
uurida juhtimise isiklikke keerukusi rahvusvahelises keskkonnas. See pani välja osa 
strateegilise kultuuri määratlusest konkreetsete käitumuslike kohandustega, mis on 
vajalikud strateegilise kultuuri lõhe ületamiseks. Tulemuseks olid teatud soovitused 
ohvitseride valmisoleku parandamiseks NATO-ELi liidese kohta, täpsemalt, et NATO ja 
EL esindavad erinevaid väljakutseid ja erinevaid kultuurikeskkondi. Lihtne on kaotada 
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keskendumine asjaolule, et välja töötatud akadeemiliste teooriate ja rahvusvaheliste 
strateegiliste doktriinide all on inimesed. Inimesed, kes suhtlevad, ületavad väljakutseid 
ja viivad ellu oma organisatsioonide kohustused ja visioonid. See magistritöö kinnitas 
edukalt inimsuhete, kultuuriuuringute rakendatavust suuremale akadeemilisele 
kontseptsioonile rahvusvaheliste suhete valdkonnas. Juhtimise arendamine on elukestev 
teekond ja NATO-ELi liides on ainulaadne väljakutse sõjaväelaste jaoks. Mis tahes 
magistritöö, mis aitab kaasa selle vastutustundlikule ja tegutsemisvõimelisele 
kujundamisele, aitab parandada kahe institutsiooni vahelist koostööd tulevikus. 
 
 
Märksõnad: Strategic culture, cross-cultural competence, NATO-EU security 
cooperation, EU strategic culture, multinational leadership development, semi-structured 
elite interview 
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